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Abstract
This paper characterizes an equilibrium payoﬀ subset for Markovian games with
private information as discounting vanishes. Monitoring is imperfect, transitions may
depend on actions, types be correlated and values interdependent. The focus is on
equilibria in which players report truthfully. The characterization generalizes that for
repeated games, reducing the analysis to static Bayesian games with transfers. With
correlated types, results from mechanism design apply, yielding a folk theorem. With
independent private values, the restriction to truthful equilibria is without loss, except
for the punishment level; if players withhold their information during punishment-like
phases, a “folk” theorem obtains also.
Keywords: Bayesian games, repeated games, folk theorem.
JEL codes: C72, C73
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Introduction

This paper studies the asymptotic equilibrium payoﬀ set of repeated Bayesian games. In
doing so, it generalizes methods that were developed for repeated games (Fudenberg and
Levine, 1994; hereafter, FL) and later extended to stochastic games (Hörner, Sugaya, Takahashi and Vieille, 2011, hereafter HSTV).
Serial correlation in the payoﬀ-relevant private information (or type) of a player makes
the analysis of such repeated games diﬃcult. Therefore, asymptotic results in this literature
∗

Yale University, 30 Hillhouse Ave., New Haven, CT 06520, USA, johannes.horner@yale.edu.
National University of Singapore, ecsst@nus.edu.sg.
‡
HEC Paris, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas, France, vieille@hec.fr.

†

1

have been obtained by means of increasingly elaborate constructions, starting with Athey
and Bagwell (2008) and culminating with Escobar and Toikka (2013).1 These constructions
are diﬃcult to extend beyond a certain point, however. Instead, our method allows us to
deal with
- moral hazard (imperfect monitoring);
- endogenous serial correlation (actions aﬀecting transitions);
- correlated types (across players) and interdependent values.
Allowing for such features is not merely of theoretical interest. There are many applications
in which some if not all of them are relevant. In insurance markets, for instance, there is
clearly persistent adverse selection (risk types), moral hazard (accidents and claims having
a stochastic component), interdependent values, action-dependent transitions (risk-reducing
behaviors) and, in the case of systemic risk, correlated types. The same holds true in ﬁnancial
asset management, and in many other applications of such models (taste or endowment
shocks, etc.)
We assume that the state proﬁle –each coordinate of which is private information to a
player– follows a controlled autonomous irreducible Markov chain. (Irreducibility refers to
its behavior under any ﬁxed Markov strategy.) In the stage game, players privately take
actions, and then a public signal realizes, whose distribution may depend both on the state
and action proﬁle, and the next round state proﬁle is drawn. Cheap-talk communication is
allowed, in the form of a public report at the beginning of each round.
The focus is on truthful equilibria, in which players truthfully reveal their type at the
beginning of each round, after every history. In addition, players’ action choices are public:
they only depend on their current type and the public history. Our main result characterizes
a subset of the limit set of equilibrium payoﬀs as the discount factor δ tends to one. While
concentrating on truth-telling equilibria is with loss of generality given the absence of any
commitment, it nevertheless turns out that this limit set includes the payoﬀ sets obtained
in all the special cases studied by the literature.2
1

This is not to say that the recursive formulations of Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990, hereafter
APS) cannot be adapted to such games. See, for instance, Cole and Kocherlakota (2001), Fernandes and
Phelan (2000), or Doepke and Townsend (2006). These papers develop methods that are extremely useful
for numerical purposes for a given discount rate, but provide little guidance regarding qualitative properties
of the equilibrium payoﬀ set.
2
The one exception is the lowest equilibrium payoﬀ in Renault, Solan and Vieille (2013), who also characterize Pareto-inferior “babbling” equilibria.
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To sum up, our contribution is twofold. First, we provide a family of one-shot games with
transfers that reduce the analysis from a dynamic inﬁnite-horizon game to a static game.
Unlike the one-shot game of FL and HSTV (special cases of ours), this one-shot game is
Bayesian. Each player makes a report, then takes an action; the transfer is then determined.
This reduction provides a bridge between dynamic games and Bayesian mechanism design.
As explained below, its payoﬀ function is not entirely standard, raising interesting new issues
for static mechanism design. Nonetheless, well-known results can be adapted for a wide class
of dynamic games. This is our second contribution: under either independent private values,
or correlated types, the analysis of the one-shot game yields an equilibrium payoﬀ set that
is best possible, except for the deﬁnition of individual rationality.
Speciﬁcally, when types are independent (though still possibly aﬀected by one’s own
action), and payoﬀs are private, all Pareto-optimal payoﬀs that are individually rational –in
the sense of dominating the stationary minmax payoﬀ– are limit equilibrium payoﬀs, provided
monitoring satisﬁes standard identiﬁability conditions. Insisting on truthfulness has a cost
in terms of individual rationality: as discussed below, the stationary minmax payoﬀ does
not generally coincide with the lowest minmax payoﬀ in the dynamic game. But this is the
only restriction imposed: leaving aside individual rationality, we show that the payoﬀ set
attained by truthful equilibria is actually equal to the limit set of all Bayes Nash equilibrium
payoﬀs, whichever message sets one chooses. In other words, in the revelation game in which
players commit to the map from reports to actions, but not to current or future reports,
there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to truthful equilibria. In this sense,
the revelation principle extends when players are patient enough. Beyond generalizing the
results of Athey and Bagwell, as well as Escobar and Toikka, this characterization has some
interesting consequences. For instance, when actions do not aﬀect transitions, the invariant
distribution of the Markov chain is a suﬃcient statistic for the Markov process, as far as this
equilibrium payoﬀ set is concerned, leaving individual rationality aside.
When types are correlated, then all feasible and individually rational payoﬀs can be
obtained in the limit (again, under suitable identiﬁability conditions). The “spanning” condition familiar from mechanism design with correlated types must be stated in terms of pairs
of states: more precisely, player −i’s current and next state must be suﬃciently informative
about player i’s current and previous state.
In Section 6.4, we elaborate on individual rationality in the case of independent private
values. The failure of truthful equilibria to attain payoﬀs as low as the minmax payoﬀ in the
dynamic game should come as no surprise: after all, the same holds for public equilibria in
repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. In this special case, our characterization
3

yields the same payoﬀ set as Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994, hereafter FLM). Yet there
is a natural class of monitoring structures for which FLM’s payoﬀ set coincides with the set of
all sequential equilibrium payoﬀs. Namely, this is the case when public signals have a product
structure. Similarly, we can build on truthful equilibria to obtain an exact characterization
of all Bayes Nash equilibrium payoﬀs (as δ → 1) when monitoring has a product structure.
This requires considering equilibria that are truthful except during punishment-like phases,
in which meaningful communication is suspended.
Hence, conclusive characterizations are obtained under independent private values as well
as correlated types. This mirrors the state of aﬀairs in static mechanism design. In fact,
our results are obtained by applying familiar techniques to the one-shot game, developed
by Arrow (1979) and d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979) for the independent case, and
d’Aspremont, Crémer and Gérard-Varet (2003) in the correlated case.
Our approach stands in contrast with the techniques based on review strategies (see Escobar and Toikka for instance) whose adaptation to incomplete information is inspired by
the linking mechanism described in Fang and Norman (2006) and Jackson and Sonnenschein
(2007). Our results imply that, as is already the case for repeated games with public monitoring, transferring continuation payoﬀs across players is an instrument that is suﬃciently
powerful to dispense with explicit statistical tests. Of course, this instrument requires that
deviations in the players’ reports can be statistically distinguished, a property that calls for
assumptions closely related to those called for in static mechanism design. Here as well, we
build on results from static mechanism design (in particular the weak identiﬁability condition introduced by Kosenok and Severinov (2008)) to ensure budget-balance in the dynamic
game.
While the characterization turns out to be a natural generalization of the one from
repeated games with public monitoring, it still has several unexpected features, reﬂecting
diﬃculties in the proof that are not present either in stochastic games with observable states.
These diﬃculties shift the emphasis of the program from payoﬀs to strategies.
To bring these diﬃculties to light, consider the case of independent types. Together with
the irreducibility of the Markov chain, this implies that the long-run (or asymptotic) payoﬀ
of a player is independent of his current state. To incentivize a player to disclose his private
information, it no longer suﬃces to adjust his long-run payoﬀ, as it aﬀects the diﬀerent types
identically. Using solely the current (ﬂow) payoﬀ to elicit truth-telling is just as inadequate,
when actions aﬀect transitions. Player i’s incentives to disclose his information depends on
the impact of his report on the transient component of his long-run payoﬀ; that is, loosely
speaking, on his ﬂow payoﬀs until the eﬀect of the initial state fades away. This transient
4

component is bounded from above, even as δ → 1: unlike in repeated games, future payoﬀs
do not eclipse ﬂow payoﬀs, as far as incentives to tell the truth are concerned. Furthermore,
this transient component cannot be summarized by a single number: its value depends on
the player’s initial state, according to the future actions played.
To resolve these diﬃculties, the proof adopts two time scales. Over the short run, the
policy that players follow (the map from reports to actions) is ﬁxed. The resulting transient
component follows directly, and is treated as a ﬂow payoﬀ. In other words, in the short
run, the ﬂow payoﬀ is computed as if strategies were Markov: the relative value that arises
in (undiscounted) dynamic programming is precisely the right measure for this transient
component. In the long run, play is decidedly non-Markovian. Play switches towards a new
Markov strategy proﬁle that metes out punishments and rewards according to the history of
public signals.
The two time scales interact, however, leading to a characterization that intermingles
both the relative value (treated as an adjustment to the ﬂow payoﬀ) and the changes in the
long-run payoﬀ (treated, as usual, as a transfer).
Games without commitment but with imperfectly persistent private types were introduced in Athey and Bagwell (2008) in the context of Bertrand oligopoly with privately observed cost. Athey and Segal (2013, hereafter AS) allow for transfers and prove an eﬃciency
result for ergodic Markov games with independent types. Their team balanced mechanism
is closely related to a normalization that is applied to the transfers in one of our proofs in
the case of independent private values.
There is also a literature on undiscounted zero-sum games with such a Markovian structure, see Renault (2006), which builds on ideas introduced in Aumann and Maschler (1995).
Not surprisingly, the average cost optimality equation plays an important role in this literature as well. Because of the importance of such games for applications in industrial organization and macroeconomics (Green, 1987), there is an extensive literature on recursive
formulations for ﬁxed discount factors (Fernandes and Phelan, 1999; Cole and Kocherlakota,
2001; Doepke and Townsend, 2006). In game theory, recent progress has been made in the
case in which the state is observed, see Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2012) and HSTV for
an asymptotic analysis, and Pęski and Wiseman (2013) for the case in which the time lag
between consecutive moves goes to zero. There are some similarities in the techniques used,
although incomplete information introduces signiﬁcant complications.3
More related are the papers by Escobar and Toikka, already mentioned, Barron (2013)
3

Among others, HSTV (as before FLM) rely on the equilibrium payoﬀ set being full-dimensional, an
assumption that fails with independent private values, as explained.
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and Renault, Solan and Vieille. All three papers assume that types are independent across
players. Barron introduces imperfect monitoring in Escobar and Toikka, but restricts attention to the case of one informed player only. This is also the case in Renault, Solan and
Vieille. This is the only paper that allows for interdependent values, although in the context
of a very particular model, namely, a sender-receiver game with perfect monitoring. None
of these papers allow transitions to depend on actions.

2

The Model

We consider dynamic games with imperfectly persistent incomplete information. The stage
game is as follows. The ﬁnite set of players is denoted I. We assume that there are at least
two players. Each player i ∈ I has a ﬁnite set S i of (private) states, and a ﬁnite set Ai of
actions. The state si ∈ S i is private information to player i. We denote by S := ×i∈I S i and
A := ×i∈I Ai the sets of state proﬁles and action proﬁles respectively.
In each round n ≥ 1, timing is as follows:
1. Each player i ∈ I privately observes his own state sin ∈ S i ;
2. Players simultaneously make reports (min )Ii=1 ∈ ×i M i , where M i is a ﬁnite set. Depending on the context, we set M i as either S i or (S i )2 ×Ai , as explained below. These
reports are publicly observed;
3. The outcome of a public correlation device is observed. For concreteness, it is a draw
from the uniform distribution on [0, 1];4
4. Players independently choose actions ain ∈ Ai . Actions taken are not observed;
5. A public signal yn ∈ Y , a ﬁnite set, and the next state proﬁle sn+1 = (sin+1 )i∈I are
drawn according to some joint distribution psn ,an ∈ Δ(S × Y ).
Throughout, we assume that the transition function p is such that the support of ps̄,ā does
not depend on s̄ and is equal to S × Y (ā) for some Y (ā) ⊆ Y .5 This implies that (i) the
controlled Markov chain (sn ) is irreducible under any Markov strategy, (ii) public signals,
whose probability might depend on (s̄, ā), do not allow players to rule out any state proﬁle
4

We do not know how to dispense with it. But given that public communication is allowed, such a public
randomization device is innocuous, as it can be replaced by jointly controlled lotteries.
5
Throughout the paper, we use s̄, ā, ȳ, etc. when referring to the values of variables s, a, y, etc. in the
“previous” round.
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s. This is consistent with perfect monitoring. Note that actions might aﬀect transitions.6
The irreducibility of the Markov chain is a strong assumption, ruling out among others the
case of perfectly persistent states (see Aumann and Maschler, 1995; Athey and Bagwell,
2008). Unfortunately, it is well known that the asymptotic analysis is very delicate without
such an assumption (see Bewley and Kohlberg, 1976). On the other hand, the full-support
assumption on S and the state-independence of the signal proﬁle are for convenience: detecting deviations only becomes easier when it is dropped, but it is then necessary to specify
out-of-equilibrium beliefs regarding private states.7,8
We also write ps,a (y) for the marginal distribution over signals y given (s, a), ps,a (t) for
the marginal distribution over state proﬁle t = sn+1 in the “next” round, etc., and extend
the domain of these distributions to mixed action proﬁles α ∈ Δ(A) in the customary way.
The stage game payoﬀ (or reward ) of player i is a function r i : S ×A → R, whose domain
is extended to mixed action proﬁles in Δ(A). As is customary, we may interpret this reward
as the expected value (with respect to the signal y) of some function g i : S × Ai × Y → R,
r i (s, a) = E[g i (s, ai , y) | a]. This interpretation is particularly natural in the case of private
values (in which case we may think of g i (si , ai , y) as the observed stage game payoﬀ), but
except in that case, we do not assume that the reward satisﬁes this factorization property.
Given the sequence of realized rewards (rni ) = (r i (sn , an )), player i’s payoﬀ in the dynamic
game is given by
+∞

(1 − δ)δ n−1 rni ,
n=1

where δ ∈ [0, 1) is common to all players. (Short-run players can be accommodated for, as
will be discussed.)
The dynamic game also speciﬁes an initial distribution p1 ∈ Δ(S), which plays no role in
6

Accommodating observable (public) states, as modeled in stochastic games, requires minor adjustments.
One way to model them is to append such states as a component to each player’s private state, perfectly
correlated across players.
7
We allow Y (ā)  Y to encompass the important special case of perfect monitoring, but the independence
from the state s̄ ensures that players do not need to abandon their belief that players announced states
/ Y (a),
truthfully. However, note that this is not quite enough to pin down beliefs about sn+1 when yn ∈
when yn is observed, yet a was supposed to be played; because transitions can depend on the action proﬁle,
beliefs about sn+1 depend on what players think the actual action proﬁle played was. This speciﬁcation can
be chosen arbitrarily, as it plays no role in the results.
8
In fact, our results only require that it be unichain, i.e., that the Markov chain deﬁned by any Markov
strategy has no two disjoint closed sets. This is the standard assumption under which the distributions specn−1
iﬁed by the rows of the limiting matrix limn→∞ n1 i=0 p(·)i are independent of the initial state; otherwise
the average cost optimality equation that is used to analyze, say, the cooperative solution is no longer valid.
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the analysis, given the irreducibility assumption and the focus on equilibrium payoﬀ vectors
as elements of RI as δ → 1.
A special case of interest is independent private values (hereafter, IPV). This is the case
in which (i) payoﬀs of a player only depend on his private state, not on the others’, that is, for
all (i, s, a), r i (s, a) = r i (si , a), (ii) conditional on the public signal y, states are independently
distributed. A formal deﬁnition is given in Section 6.
But we do not restrict attention to private values, nor to independent types. In the
case of interdependent values, it matters whether players observe their payoﬀs or not. It is
possible to accommodate privately observed payoﬀs: simply deﬁne a player’s private state as
including his last realized payoﬀ.9 As we shall see, the reports of a player’s opponents in the
next round are taken into account when evaluating the truthfulness of a player’s report, so
that one could build on the results of Mezzetti (2004, 2007) in static mechanism design with
interdependent valuations. Hence, we assume that a player’s private action, private state,
the public signal and report proﬁle is all the information available to him.10
In fact, our main characterization result extends immediately to the case in which monitoring is private, rather than public; see Section 5.0.3 for a discussion. As we focus on public
monitoring for the applications that are considered in Sections 6 and 7, we have refrained
from such generality here.
Monetary transfers are not allowed. We view the stage game as capturing all possible
interactions among players, and there is no diﬃculty in interpreting some actions as monetary
transfers. In this sense, rather than ruling out monetary transfers, what is assumed here is
limited liability.
The game deﬁned above allows for public communication among players. In doing so, we
follow most of the literature on Markovian games with private information, see Athey and
Bagwell (2001, 2008), Escobar and Toikka, Renault, Solan and Vieille, etc.11 As in static
9

With this interpretation, pointed out by AS, interdependent values with observable payoﬀs reduce to
private values ex post, as conditional on a player’s entire information, a player’s payoﬀ does not depend on
the other players’ types. It would then be natural to allow for a second round of messages at the end of each
period.
10
However, our notion of equilibrium is sensitive to what goes into a state: by enlarging it, one weakly
increases the equilibrium payoﬀ set. For instance, one could also include in a player’s state his previous
realized action, which following Kandori (2003) is useful even when incomplete information is trivial and the
game is simply a repeated game with public monitoring; such an enlargement is peripheral to our objective
and will not be pursued here.
11
This is not to say that introducing a mediator would be uninteresting. Following Myerson (1986), we
could then appeal to a revelation principle, although without commitment from the players this would simply
shift the inferential problem to the recommendation step of the mediator.
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Bayesian mechanism design, communication is required for coordination even in the absence
of strategic motives; communication allows us to characterize what restrictions on payoﬀs,
if any, are imposed by non-cooperative behavior.
As we insist on sequential rationality, players are assumed to be unable to commit. Hence,
the revelation principle does not apply. As is well known (see Bester and Strausz, 2000, 2001),
it is not possible a priori to restrict attention to direct mechanisms, corresponding to the
choice M i = S i (or M i = Ai × (S i )2 , as explained below), let alone to truthful behavior.
Yet this is precisely the types of equilibria that we will focus on. The next section
illustrates some of the issues that this raises.

3

Some Examples

Example 1—A Silent Game. This game follows Renault (2006). This is a zero-sum
two-player game in which player 1 has two private states, s1 and ŝ1 , and player 2 has a single
state, omitted. Player 1 has actions A1 = {T, B} and player 2 has actions A2 = {L, R}.
Player 1’s reward is given by Figure 1. Recall that rewards are not observed. States s1

T
B

L
1
0

R
0
0

T
B

s1

L
0
0

R
0
1
ŝ1

Figure 1: Player 1’s reward in Example 1
and ŝ1 are equally likely in the initial round, and transitions are action-independent, with
p ∈ [1/2, 1) denoting the probability that the state remains unchanged from one round to
the next.
Set M 1 := {s1 , ŝ1 }, so that player 1 can disclose his state if he wishes to. Will he? By
revealing the state, player 2 can secure a payoﬀ of 0 by playing R or L depending on player
1’s report. Yet player 1 can secure a payoﬀ of 1/4 by choosing reports and actions at random.
In fact, this is the (uniform) value of this game for p = 1 (Aumann and Maschler, 1995).
When p < 1, player 1 can actually get more than this by trading oﬀ the higher expected
reward from a given action with the information that it gives away. He has no interest in
giving this information away for free through informative reports. Silence is called for.
Just because we may focus on the silent game does not mean that it is easy to solve.

9

Its (limit) value for arbitrary p > 2/3 is still unknown.12 Because the optimal strategies
depend on player 2’s belief about player 1’s state, the problem of solving for them is inﬁnitedimensional, and all that can be done is to characterize its solution via some functional
equation (see Hörner, Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille, 2010).
Non-existence of truthful equilibria in some games is no surprise. The tension between
truth-telling and lack of commitment also arises in bargaining and contracting, giving rise to
the ratchet eﬀect (see Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole, 1985). What Example 1 illustrates is
that small message spaces are just as diﬃcult to deal with as larger ones. When players hide
their information, their behavior reﬂects their private beliefs, which calls for a state space
as large as it gets.
The surprise, then, is that the literature on Markovian games (Athey and Bagwell, 2001,
2008, Escobar and Toikka; Renault, Solan and Vieille) manages to get positive results at
all: in most games, eﬃciency requires coordination, and thus disclosure of (some) private
information. As will be clear from Section 6, existence is much easier to obtain in the IPV
environment, the focus of most of these papers. Example 1 involves both interdependent
values and independent types, an ominous combination in mechanism design: with interdependent values, the uninformed player’s payoﬀ depends on the informed player’s type, so
that he cannot resist adjusting his action to the message he receives. This might hurt the
informed player, who cannot be statistically disciplined into truth-telling, given independent
types.
In our dynamic environment as well, positive results will obtain as soon as we impose
private values or relax independent types.
Example 2—A Game that Leaves No Player Indiﬀerent. Player 1 has two private
states, s1 and ŝ1 , and player 2 has a single state, omitted. Player 1 has actions A1 = {T, B}
and player 2 has actions A2 = {L, R}. Rewards are given by Figure 2 (values are private).
The two types s1 and ŝ1 are i.i.d. over time and equally likely. Monitoring is perfect. To
minmax player 2, player 1 must randomize uniformly, independently of his type. But clearly
player 1 has a strictly dominant strategy in the repeated game, playing T in state s1 and
B in state ŝ1 . Even if player 1’s continuation utility were to be chosen freely, it would not
be possible to get player 1 to randomize in both states: to play B when his type is s1 , or T
12

It is known for p ∈ [1/2, 2/3] and some speciﬁc values. Pęski and Toikka (private communication) have
recently shown that this value is non-increasing in p, and Bressaud and Quas (private communication) have
determined the optimal strategies for values of p up to ∼ .7323.
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T
B

L
1, 1
0, −1

R
1, −1
0, 1

T
B

s1

L
0, 1
1, −1

R
0, −1
1, 1
ŝ1

Figure 2: A two-player game in which the mixed minmax payoﬀ cannot be achieved.
when his type is ŝ1 , he must be compensated by $1 in continuation utility. But then he has
an incentive to report his type incorrectly, to pocket this promised utility while playing his
favorite action.
This example illustrates that ﬁne-tuning continuation payoﬀs to make a player indiﬀerent
between several actions in several private states simultaneously is generally impossible to
achieve with independent types. This still leaves open the possibility of a player randomizing
for one of his types. This is especially useful when each player has only one type, like in
a standard repeated game, as it then delivers the usual mixed minmax payoﬀ. Indeed, the
characterization below yields a minmax payoﬀ somewhere in between the mixed and the pure
minmax payoﬀ, depending on the particular game considered. This example also shows that
truth-telling is restrictive even with independent private values: in the silent game, player
1’s unique equilibrium strategy minmaxes player 2, as he is left guessing player 1’s action.
Leaving a player in the dark about one’s state can serve as a substitute for mixing at the
action step. To achieve lower equilibrium payoﬀs, truth-telling must be abandoned, at least
during punishments. As follows from Theorem 4 below, it is indeed possible to drive player
2’s payoﬀ down to his minmax payoﬀ of 0 in equilibrium, as δ → 1.
Example 3—Waiting for Evidence. There are two players. Player 1 has K + 1 types,
S 1 = {0, 1, . . . , K}, while player 2 has only two types, S 2 = {0, 1}. Transitions do not depend
on actions (omitted), and are as follows. If s1n = k > 0, then s2n = 0 and s1n+1 = s1n − 1.
If s1n = 0, then s2n = 1 and s1n+1 is drawn randomly (and uniformly) from S 1 . In words, s1n
stands for the number of rounds until the next occurrence of s2 = 1. By waiting no more
than K rounds, all reports by player 1 can be veriﬁed.
This example makes two closely related points. First, in order for player −i to statistically
discriminate between player i’s states, it is not necessary that his set of signals (here, players
−i’s states) be as rich as player i’s, unlike in static mechanism design with correlated types
(the familiar “spanning condition” of Crémer and McLean, 1988, generically satisﬁed if only
if |S −i | ≥ |S i |). Two states for one player can be enough to cross-check the reports of
11

an opponent with many more states, provided that states in later rounds are informative
enough.
Second, the long-term dependence of the stochastic process implies that one player’s
report should not always be evaluated on the ﬂy. It is better to hold oﬀ until more evidence
is collected. Note that this is not the same kind of delay as the one that makes review
strategies eﬀective, taking advantage of the central limit theorem to devise powerful tests
even when signals are independently distributed over time (see Radner, 1986; Fang and
Norman, 2006; Jackson and Sonnenschein, 2007). It is precisely because of the dependence
that waiting is useful here.
This raises an interesting statistical question: does the tail of the sequence of private
states of player −i contain indispensable information in evaluating the truthfulness of player
i’s report in a given round, or is the distribution of this inﬁnite sequence, conditional on
(sin , sn−1 ), summarized by the distribution of an initial segment of the sequence? This
question appears to be open in general. In the case of transitions that do not depend
on actions, it has been raised by Blackwell and Koopmans (1957) and answered by Gilbert
13
(1959): it is enough to consider the next 2|S i | + 1 values of the sequence (s−i
n )n ≥n .
At the very least, when types are correlated and the Markov chain exhibits time dependence, it is useful to condition player i’s continuation payoﬀ given his report about sin on
−i’s next private state, s−i
n+1 . Because this suﬃces to obtain suﬃcient conditions analogous
to those invoked in the static case, we will limit ourselves to this conditioning.14

4

Truthful Equilibria

Given M := ×i∈I M i , a public history at the start of round n ≥ 1 is a sequence hpub,n =
(m1 , y1, . . . , mn−1 , yn−1 ) ∈ Hpub,n := (M × Y )n−1 . Player i’s private history at the start of
round n is a sequence hin = (si1 , m1 , ai1 , y1 , . . . , sin−1 , mn−1 , ain−1 , yn−1 ) ∈ Hni := (S i ×M ×Ai ×
Y )n−1 . (Here, H1i = Hpub,1 := {∅}.) A (behavior) strategy for player i is a pair of sequences
(mi , ai ) = (min , ain )n∈N with min : Hni × S i → Δ(M i ), and ain : Hni × S i × M → Δ(Ai ), which
specify i’s report and action as a function of his private information, his current state and
13

The reporting strategy deﬁnes a hidden Markov chain on pairs of states, reports and signals that induces
a stationary process over reports and signals; Gilbert assumes that the hidden Markov chain is irreducible
and aperiodic, which here need not be (with truthful reporting, the report is equal to the state), but his
result continues to hold when these assumptions are dropped, see for instance Dharmadhikari (1963).
14
See Obara (2008) for some of the diﬃculties encountered in dynamic settings when attempting to extend
results from static mechanism design with correlated types.
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the report proﬁle in the current round.15 A strategy proﬁle (m, a) deﬁnes a distribution over
ﬁnite and by extension over inﬁnite histories in the usual way, and we consider the sequential
equilibria of this game.
A special class of games are “standard” repeated games with public monitoring, in which
i
S is a singleton set for each player i and we can ignore the m-component of players’ strategies. For such games, FL provide a convenient algorithm to describe and study a subset of
equilibrium payoﬀs –perfect public equilibrium payoﬀs. A perfect public equilibrium (PPE)
is an equilibrium in which players’ strategies are public; that is, a is adapted to (Hpub,n )n ,
so that players ignore any additional private information (their own past actions). Their
characterization of the set of PPE payoﬀ vectors, E(δ), as δ → 1 relies on the notion of a
score deﬁned as follows. Let Λ denote the unit sphere of RI . We refer to λ ∈ Λ (or λi ) as
weights, although the coordinates need not be nonnegative.
Deﬁnition 1 Fix λ ∈ Λ. Let
k(λ) = sup λ · v,
v,x,α

where the supremum is taken over all v ∈ RI , x : Y → RI and α ∈ ×i∈I Δ(Ai ) such that
(i) α is a Nash equilibrium with payoﬀ v of the game with payoﬀ r(a) +


y

pa (y)x(y);

(ii) For all y ∈ Y , it holds that λ · x(y) ≤ 0.
Let H :=



λ∈Λ {v

∈ RI | λ · v ≤ k(λ)}. FL prove the following.

Theorem 1 (FL) It holds that E(δ) ⊆ H for any δ < 1; moreover, if H has non-empty
interior, then limδ→1 E(δ) = H.
Our purpose is to obtain a similar characterization for the broader class of games considered here. To do so while preserving the recursive nature of the equilibrium payoﬀ set
that will be described compels us to focus on a particular class of equilibria in which players
report truthfully their private state in every round, on and oﬀ path, and do not condition
on their earlier private information, but only on the public history and their current state.
The complete information game with transfers x that appears in the deﬁnition of the score
must be replaced with a two-step Bayesian game with communication, formally deﬁned in
the next section. Here, we brieﬂy motivate its main ingredients.
FL’s algorithm is remarkable in its parsimony: as its proof makes clear, the past, that
is, the public history leading to a given period, can be summarized by some value of λ.
15

Recall however that a public correlation device is assumed, although it is omitted from the notations.
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This parameter can be interpreted as the relative standings of the players, determining who
should be punished and who should be rewarded. Meanwhile, the future is summarized by
the transfer x, converting instantly the realized signal into a continuation payoﬀ.
We must add parameters. Because players’ incentives to reveal their state depend on
their beliefs about the other players’ states, we must keep track of these beliefs, in addition
to the players’ relative standings. This is where the focus on truthful equilibria is powerful:
because the other players’ last report discloses their last type, it subsumes their past reports.
In addition, because their action choices are a function of the public history, this last report
also pins down player i’s belief about their last (mixed) action, which matters for his beliefs.
Finally, because the private state proﬁle follows a Markov process, there is no need for player
i to keep track of his own private history, beyond his last state and realized action.
To summarize, player i’s beliefs can be summarized by some (public) parameters: these
correspond to the last report made by his opponents as well as to the last public signal; and
by his private information, namely, his previous state, his previous choice of action and his
current state. Hence, the Bayesian game will be parametrized by some (mn−1 , yn−1) ∈ M ×Y ,
which is public, as well as by player i’s private information (sin−1 , ain−1 , sin ) ∈ (S i )2 × Ai .
This is why the natural choice for the message space is M i = (S i )2 × Ai . It allows
player i to report all his private information. Along the equilibrium path, this involves
repetitions. But it matters when the last report of player i was not truthful regarding his
current state; the one-shot deviation principle does not apply here. Players −i cannot detect
such a deviation, which is “on-schedule,” to borrow Athey and Bagwell (2008)’s terminology.
For truthful reporting oﬀ path, the choice of M i makes a diﬀerence: with M i = S i , player
i would be asked to tell the truth regarding his “payoﬀ-type,” but possibly to lie about his
“belief-type” (which would be incorrectly believed to be determined by his report of sin−1 ,
along with his current report). In the IPV case, however, this enlargement is unnecessary,
as past deviations do not aﬀect i’s conditional beliefs. We will then set M i = S i . In what
follows, a type of player i refers to the true element of M i , to be distinguished from his state,
an element of S i .
Hence, we must enlarge the type space, and we must also enlarge the set of parameters
that summarizes the past, to account not only for λ, but also for (mn−1 , yn−1 ). Similarly, we
cannot simply summarize the future by a transfer determined on the ﬂy. This is the point
of Example 3. Because tomorrow’s report s−i
n+1 is informative about player i’s report about
sin , it should be included as an argument of the transfer xi . This is fortunate, as we have
just argued that player i’s type is rich, including both his previous type sin−1 and his current
−i
type sin . Using both s−i
n and sn+1 (as well as yn ) as arguments of the transfer allows us to
14

augment the set of correlated “signals” proportionately.
Last but not least, we must adjust the payoﬀ function of the Bayesian game. To see why
this must be so, consider the case in which there is only one player, and set λ = 1. Because
the purpose of transfers is to align individual and collective interests, there is no need for
them. The score should then simply be the value of the Markov decision process. But
clearly, if actions aﬀect transitions, then the optimal action is not the one that maximizes
the ﬂow payoﬀ: it must also account for the impact of this action on future states. To take
this into account in the stage game, we must somehow convert the future costs and beneﬁts
from a given action into current terms. This is the essence of dynamic programming: the
continuation values summarizes these costs and beneﬁts. Here, we consider the case of
low discounting, so that the appropriate functional equation is the average cost optimality
equation, formally described in the next section. The relative value is the right measure
to convert these costs into current units. It will be added to the ﬂow payoﬀ, as a basic
ingredient of our Bayesian game.
A strategy (mi , ai ) is public and truthful if min (hin , sin ) = (sin−1 , ain−1 , sin ) (or sin in the IPV
case) for all histories hin , n ≥ 1, and ai (hin , sin , mn ) depends on (hpub,n , sin , mn ) only (with the
obvious adjustment in the initial round). The solution concept is sequential equilibrium in
public and truthful strategies.
The next section describes the family of Bayesian games formally.

5

The Main Result

In this section, M i := S i ×Ai ×S i for all i. A proﬁle m of reports is written m = (mp , ma , mc ),
where mp (resp. mc ) is interpreted as the report proﬁle on previous (resp. current) states,
and ma is the reported (last round) action proﬁle.
We set Ωpub := M × Y , and we refer to the pair (mn , yn ) as the public outcome of round
n. This is the additional public information available at the end of round n. We also refer
to (sn , mn , an , yn ) as the outcome of round n, and denote by Ω := Ωpub × S × A the set of
possible outcomes in any given round.
5.0.1

The Average Cost Optimality Equation

Our analysis makes use of the so-called Average Cost Optimality Equation (ACOE) that
plays an important role in dynamic programming. For completeness, we provide here an
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elementary statement, which is suﬃcient for our purpose and we refer to Puterman (1994)
for details and additional properties.
Let be given an irreducible (or more generally unichain) transition function q over the
ﬁnite set S with invariant measure μ, and a payoﬀ function u : S → R.16 Assume that
successive states (sn ) follow a Markov chain with transition function q and that a decisionmaker receives the reward u(sn ) in round n. The long-run payoﬀ of the decision-maker is
v = Eμ [u(s)]. While this long-run payoﬀ is independent of the initial state, discounted payoﬀs
are not. Lemma 1 below provides a normalized measure of the diﬀerences in discounted
payoﬀs, for diﬀerent initial states. Here and in what follows, t stands for the “next” state
proﬁle (“tomorrow” ’s state), given the current state proﬁle s.
Lemma 1 There is θ : S → R such that
v + θ(s) = u(s) + Et∼ps (·) θ(t).
The map θ is unique, up to an additive constant. It admits an intuitive interpretation in
γδ (s) − γδ (s )
terms of discounted payoﬀs. Indeed, the diﬀerence θ(s) − θ(s ) is equal to lim
,
δ→1
1−δ
where γδ (s) is the discounted payoﬀ when starting for s. For this reason, following standard
terminology, call θ the (vector of) relative values.
The map θ provides a “one-shot” measure of the relative value of being in a given state;
with persistent and possibly action-dependent transitions, the relative value is an essential
ingredient in converting the dynamic game into a one-shot game, alongside the invariant
measure μ. The former encapsulates the relevant information regarding future payoﬀs, while
the latter is essential in aggregating the diﬀerent one-shot games, parameterized by their
states. Both μ and θ are usually deﬁned as the solutions of a ﬁnite system of equations –the
balance equations and the equations stated in Lemma 1. But in the ergodic case that we
are concerned with, explicit formulas exist. (See, for instance, Iosifescu, 1980, p.123, for the
invariant distribution; and Puterman, 1994, Appendix A for the relative values.)
5.0.2

Admissible Pairs

The characterization of FL for repeated games involves a family of optimization problems,
in which one optimizes over equilibria α of the underlying stage game, with payoﬀ functions
augmented by transfers x, see Deﬁnition 1.
16

As is well known, the unichain assumption cannot be relaxed.
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Because we insist on truthful equilibria, and because we need to incorporate the dynamic
eﬀects of actions on states, we must consider policies instead, i.e. maps ρ : S → Δ(A) and
transfers, such that reporting truthfully and playing ρ constitutes a stationary equilibrium
of the dynamic two-step game augmented with transfers. While policies depend only on
current states, transfers will depend on the previous and current public outcomes, as well as
on the next reported states.
Let such a policy ρ : S → Δ(A), and transfers x : Ωpub × Ωpub × S → RI be given.
We will assume that for each i ∈ I, xi (ω̄pub , ωpub , t) is independent of i’s own state ti .17
Assuming states are truthfully reported and actions chosen according to ρ, the sequence
(ωn ) of outcomes is a unichain Markov chain, and so is the sequence (ω̃n ), where ω̃n =
(ωpub,n−1 , mn ), with transition function denoted πρ , and with invariant measure μρ .
Let θρ,r+x : Ωpub × M → RI denote the relative values of the players, obtained when
applying Lemma 1 to the latter chain (and to all players).18
Thanks to the ACOE, the condition that reporting truthfully and playing ρ is a stationary
equilibrium of the dynamic game with stage payoﬀs r + x can to some extent be rephrased
as saying that, for each ω̄pub ∈ Ωpub , reporting truthfully and playing ρ is an equilibrium in
the one-shot Bayesian game in which states s are drawn according to p (given ω̄pub ), players
submit reports m, then choose actions a, and obtain the (random) payoﬀ
r(s, a) + x(ω̄pub , ωpub , t) + θρ,r+x (ωpub , m ),
where (y, t) are chosen according to ps,a and ωpub = (m, y).19
However, because we insist on oﬀ-path truth-telling, we need to consider arbitrary private
histories, and the formal condition is therefore more involved. Fix a player i. Given a triple
i
(ω̄pub , s̄i , āi ), let Dρ,x
(ω̄pub , s̄i , āi ) denote the two-step decision problem in which
Step 1 s ∈ S is drawn according to the belief held by player i;20 player i is informed of si ,
17

This requirement will not be systematically stated, but it is assumed throughout.
There is here a slight and innocuous abuse of notation: θρ,r+x solves the equations v + θ(ω̄pub , m) =
r(s, ρ(s)) + E[x(ω̄pub , ωpub, t) + θ(ωpub , m )], where v = Eμρ [r(s, a) + x(ω̄pub , ωpub, t)] is the long-run payoﬀ
under ρ.
19
Lemma 1 deﬁnes the relative values for an exogenous Markov chain, or equivalently for a ﬁxed policy. It
is simply an “accounting” identity. The standard ACOE delivers more: given some Markov decision problem
(MDP), a policy ρ is optimal if and only if, for all states s, ρ(s) maximizes the right-hand side of the equations
of Lemma 1. Both results will be invoked interchangeably.
20
Recall that player i assumes that players −i report truthfully and play ρ−i . Hence player i assigns
−i
probability 1 to s̄−i = m̄−i
c , and to previous actions being drawn according to ρ (m̄c ); hence this belief
assigns to s ∈ S the probability ps̄,ρ(s̄)) (s | ȳ). This is the case unless ȳ is inconsistent with ρ−i (m̄c ); if this
is the case, use the same updating rule with some other arbitrary ã−i such that ȳ ∈ Y (ã−i , āi ).
18
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then submits a report mi ∈ M i ;
−i −i
Step 2 player i learns current states s−i from the opponents’ reports m−i = (m̄−i
c , ā , s ),
and then chooses an action ai ∈ Ai . The payoﬀ to player i is given by
i
r i (s, a) + xi (ω̄pub , ωpub , t−i ) + θρ,r+x
(ωpub , m ),

(1)

where a−i is drawn according to ρ−i (s−i , mic ) and the pair (y, t) is drawn according to
ps,a , and ωpub := (m, y).
i
i
the collection of decision problems Dρ,x
(ω̄pub , s̄i , āi ).
We denote by Dρ,x

i
report
Deﬁnition 2 The pair (ρ, x) is admissible if all optimal strategies of player i in Dρ,x
i
i i i
truthfully m = (s̄ , ā , s ) in Step 1 (Truth-telling); then, in Step 2, conditional on all players reporting truthfully in Step 1, ρi (s) is a (not necessarily unique) optimal mixed action
(Obedience).

Requiring in addition ρ to be pure, and ρi (mc ) to be optimal even after a lie would yield
a smaller set of admissible pairs, and hence a weakening of Theorem 2 below. Yet, this
weakened version would suﬃce to deliver all results derived in Sections 6 and 7.
Some comments are in order. The condition that ρ be played once states (not necessarily
types) have been reported truthfully simply means that, for each ω̄pub and m = (s̄, ā, s) the
action proﬁle ρ(s) is an equilibrium of the complete information one-shot game with payoﬀ
function r(s, a) + x(ω̄pub , ωpub , t) + θρ,r+x (ωpub , m ).
The truth-telling condition is slightly more delicate to interpret. Consider ﬁrst an outcome ω̄ ∈ Ω such that s̄i = m̄ic and āi = ρi (s̄) for all i –no player has lied or deviated in the
previous round, assuming the action to be played was pure. Given such an outcome, all players share the same belief over next types, given by ps̄,ā (· | ȳ). Consider the Bayesian game
in which (i) s ∈ S is drawn according to the latter distribution, (ii) players make reports m,
then choose actions a, and (iii) get the payoﬀ r(s, a) + x(ω̄pub , ωpub , t) + θρ,r+x (ωpub , m ). The
admissibility condition for such an outcome ω̄ is equivalent to requiring that truth-telling
followed by ρ is an equilibrium of this Bayesian game, with “strict” incentives at the reporting
step.21
The admissibility requirement in Deﬁnition 2 is demanding, however, in that it requires
in addition truth-telling to be optimal for player i at any outcome ω̄ such that (s̄−i , ā−i ) =
21

Quotation marks are needed, since we have not deﬁned oﬀ-path behavior. What we mean is that any
on-path deviation at the reporting step leads to a lower payoﬀ, no matter what action is then taken.
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−i
i
i
i
i
(m̄−i
c , ρ (m̄c )), but s̄ = m̄c (or ā = ρ (m̄c )). Following such outcomes, players do not share
the same belief over the next states. The same issue arises if the action proﬁle ρi (m̄c ) is
mixed. Therefore, it is inconvenient to state the admissibility requirement by means of a
simple, subjective Bayesian game –hence the formulation in terms of a decision problem.
In loose terms, truth-telling is the unique best-reply at the reporting step of player i to
truth-telling and ρ−i . Note that we require truth-telling to be optimal (mi = (s̄i , āi , si )) even
if player i did misreport his previous state (m̄ic = s̄i ). On the other hand, Deﬁnition 2 puts
no restriction on player i’s behavior if he lies in Step 1 (mi = (s̄i , āi , si )). The second part
of Deﬁnition 2 is equivalent to saying that ρi (s) is one best-reply to ρ−i (s) in the complete
information game with payoﬀ function given by (1) when m = (s̄, ā, s).
The requirement that truth-telling be uniquely optimal reﬂects an important diﬀerence
between our approach to Bayesian games and the traditional approach of APS in repeated
games. In the case of repeated games, continuation play is summarized by the continuation
payoﬀ. Here, the future does not only aﬀect incentives via the long-run continuation payoﬀ,
but also via the relative values. However, we do not know of a simple relationship between
v and θ. Our construction involves “repeated games” strategies that are “approximately”
policies, so that θ can be derived from (ρ, x). This shifts the emphasis from payoﬀs to
policies, and requires us to implement a speciﬁc policy. Truth-telling incentives must be
strict for the approximation involved not to aﬀect them. Fortunately, this requirement is
not demanding, as it will be implied by standard assumptions in the correlated case, and by
some weak assumption (Assumption 1 below) on feasible policies in the IPV case.
We denote by C0 the set of admissible pairs (ρ, x).

5.0.3

The Characterization

For given weights λ ∈ Λ, we denote by P0 (λ) the optimization program sup λ · v, where the
supremum is taken over all triples (v, ρ, x) such that
- (ρ, x) ∈ C0 ;
- λ · x(·) ≤ 0;
- v = Eμρ [r(s, a) + x(ω̄pub , ωpub , t)], where μρ ∈ Δ(Ωpub × Ωpub × S) is the invariant
distribution under truth-telling and ρ, so that v is the long-run payoﬀ induced by
(ρ, x).
The three conditions mirror those of Deﬁnition 1 for the case of repeated games. The ﬁrst
condition (admissibility) and the third condition are the counterparts of the Nash condition
19

in Deﬁnition 1(i); the second condition is the “budget-balance” requirement imposed by
Deﬁnition 1(ii). In what follows, budget-balance refers to this property.
We denote by k0 (λ) the value of P0 (λ) and set H0 := {v ∈ RI , λ·v ≤ k0 (λ) for all λ ∈ Λ}.
Theorem 2 Assume that H0 has non-empty interior. Then it is included in the limit set of
truthful equilibrium payoﬀs.
This result is simple enough. For instance, in the case of “standard” repeated games with
public monitoring, Theorem 2 generalizes FLM, yielding the folk theorem with the mixed
minmax under their assumptions.
We note that Theorem 2 is also valid when M i = S i and when the deﬁnition of an
admissible pair is modiﬁed in an obvious way.
To be clear, there is no reason to expect Theorem 2 to provide a characterization of the
entire limit set of truthful equilibrium payoﬀs. One might hope to achieve a larger set of
payoﬀs by employing ﬁner statistical tests (using the serial correlation in states), just as
one can achieve a bigger set of equilibrium payoﬀs in repeated games than the set of PPE
payoﬀs, by considering statistical tests (and private strategies). There is an obvious cost in
terms of the simplicity of the characterization. As it turns out, ours is suﬃcient to obtain all
the equilibrium payoﬀs known in special cases, and more generally, all individually rational
Bayes Nash equilibrium payoﬀs (including the Pareto frontier) under independent private
values, as well as a folk theorem under correlated values.22
Two variations to this theorem are worth mentioning. First, Theorem 2 can be adapted
to the case in which some of the players are short-run, whether or not such players have
private information (in which case, assume that it is independent across rounds). As this is
a standard feature of such characterizations (see FL, for instance), we will be brief. Suppose
that players i ∈ LR = {1, . . . , L}, L ≤ I are long-run players, whose preferences are as
before, with discount factor δ < 1. Players j ∈ SR = {L + 1, . . . , I} are short-run players,
each representative of which plays only once. We consider a “Stackelberg” structure, common
in economic applications, in which long-run players make their reports ﬁrst, thereupon the
short-run players do as well (if they have any private information), and we set M i = S i
for the short-run players. Actions are simultaneous. Let mLR ∈ M LR = ×Li=1 M i denote
22

Besides, an exact characterization would require an analysis in RS , mapping each type proﬁle into a
payoﬀ for each player. When the players’ types follow independent Markov chains and values are private,
this makes no diﬀerence, as the players’ limit equilibrium payoﬀ must be independent of the initial type
proﬁle, given irreducibility and incentive-compatibility. But when types are correlated, it is possible to
assign diﬀerent (to be clear, long-run) equilibrium payoﬀs to a given player, as a function of the initial state.
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an arbitrary report by the long-run players. Given a policy ρLR : M → ×i∈LR Δ(Ai ) of the
long-run players, mapping reports m = (mLR , sSR ) (with sSR = (sL+1 , . . . , sI )) into mixed
actions, we let B(mLR , ρLR ) denote the best-reply correspondence of the short-run players,
namely, the sequential equilibria of the two-step game (reports and actions) between players
in SR. We then modify the deﬁnition of admissible pair (ρ, x) so as to require that the
reports and actions of the short-run players be in B(mLR , ρLR ) for all reports mLR by the
long-run players, where ρLR is the restriction of ρ to players in LR. The requirements on
the long-run players are the same as in Deﬁnition 2.
Second, signals can be private. That is, we may replace Step 5 in Section 2 by: A proﬁle
yn = (yni ) ∈ Y := ×i Y i of private signals and the next state proﬁle sn+1 = (sin+1 )i∈I are
drawn according to some joint distribution psn ,an ∈ Δ(S × Y ). We then re-deﬁne a message
mi as including: player i’s state, action and signal in the last period, and player i’s current
state. Transfers are then assumed to depend on the past, current and next message proﬁle,
with the restriction, as with public monitoring, that player i’s transfer does not depend on
his own future message, only on player −i’s. The deﬁnition of admissibility remains the
same, given the re-deﬁned message space, and so does the statement of the theorem.
In a sense, this more general formulation is also more natural, as the current one already
reduces the program to a one-player decision-theoretic problem, in which each player must
report his private information; he might as well report the signal he observed, and the payoﬀ
he received, in case of known-own payoﬀs. This variation mirrors Kandori and Matsushima
(1998)’s extension of FLM to private monitoring; the issues that they raise regarding the
possibility of a folk theorem in truthful strategies under imperfect information apply here as
well. As we would like to focus on the new ones that incomplete information introduces, our
applications assume public monitoring throughout.

5.1

Proof Overview

Here, we explain the main ideas behind the proof of Theorem 2. For simplicity, we assume
perfect monitoring and action-independent transitions. For notational simplicity also, we
limit ourselves to admissible pairs (ρ, x) such that transfers x : M × M × A → RI do not
depend on previous public signals (which do not aﬀect transitions here). This is not without
loss of generality, but going to the general case is mostly a matter of notations.
Our proof is best viewed as an extension of the recursive approach of FLM to the case
of persistent, private information. To serve as a benchmark, assume ﬁrst that types are
i.i.d. across rounds, with law μ ∈ Δ(S). The game is then truly a repeated game, and the
21

characterization of FLM applies. In that set-up, and according to Deﬁnition 2, (ρ, x) is an
admissible pair if for each m̄, reporting truthfully and then playing ρ is an equilibrium in
the Bayesian game with prior distribution μ and payoﬀ function r(s, a) + x(m̄, m, a) (and if
the relevant incentive-compatibility inequalities are strict).
It is useful to provide a quick reminder of the FLM proof, specialized to the present
set-up. Let Z be a smooth compact set in the interior of H0 , and a discount factor δ < 1.
Given an initial target payoﬀ vector v ∈ Z, (and m̄ ∈ M), one picks an appropriately chosen
direction λ ∈ Λ, and we choose an admissible pair (ρ, x) such that (ρ, x, v) is feasible in
P0 (λ).23 Players are required to report truthfully their type and to play (on path) according
1−δ
x(m̄, m, a) for each (m, a) ∈ M × A.
to ρ, and we update the target to wm̄,m,a := v +
δ
Provided δ is large enough, the vectors wm̄,m,a belong to Z, and this construction can thus be
iterated, leading to a well-deﬁned strategy proﬁle σ in the repeated game.24 The expected
payoﬀ under σ is v, and the continuation payoﬀ in step 2, conditional on public history
(m, a), is equal to wm̄,m,a , when computed at the ex ante stage, before players learn their
step-2 types. The fact that (ρ, x) is admissible implies that σ yields an equilibrium in the
one-shot game with payoﬀ (1 − δ)r(s, a) + δwm̄,m,a . A one-step deviation principle then
applies, implying that σ is a sequential equilibrium of the repeated game, with payoﬀ v.
Assume now that the type proﬁles (sn ) follow an irreducible Markov chain with invariant
measure μ. The proof outlined above fails as soon as types as auto-correlated. Indeed, the
initial type of player i now provides information over types in step 2. Hence, at the interim
stage in step 1, (using the above notations) the expected continuation payoﬀs of player i are
no longer given by wm̄,m,a . This is the rationale for including the continuation relative values
into the deﬁnition of admissible pairs.
But this raises a diﬃculty. In any recursive construction such as the one outlined above,
continuation relative values (which help deﬁne current play) are deﬁned by continuation
play, which itself is based on current play, leading to an uninspiring circularity. On the other
hand, our deﬁnition of an admissible pair (ρ, x) involves the relative values θρ,r+x induced by
an indeﬁnite play of (ρ, x). This diﬃculty is solved by adjusting the recursive construction
in such a way that players always expect the current admissible pair (ρ, x) to be used in
the foreseeable future. On the technical side, this is achieved by letting players stick to an
admissible pair (ρ, x) during a random number of rounds, with a geometric distribution of
parameter ξ. The target vector is updated only when switching to a new direction (and to
a new admissible pair). The random time at which switching occurs is determined by the
23
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If v is a boundary point, λ is an outwards pointing normal to Z at v.
With wm̄,m,a serving as the target payoﬀ vector in the next, second, step.
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correlation device. The parameter ξ is chosen large enough compared to 1 − δ, ensuring that
target payoﬀs always remain within the set Z. Yet, ξ is chosen small enough so that the
continuation relative values be approximately equal to θρ,r+x : in terms of relative values, it
is almost as if (ρ, x) were used forever.
Equilibrium properties are derived from the observation that, by Deﬁnition 2, the incentive to report truthfully (and then to play ρ) would be strict if the continuation private
values were truly equal to θρ,r+x and thus, still holds when equality holds only approximately.
All the details are provided in the Appendix.

6

Independent Private Values

This section considers the special case of independent private values.
Deﬁnition 3 The game has independent private values (IPV) if:
- The stage game payoﬀ function of i depends on his own state only: for every i and
(s, ai , y), g i (s, ai , y) = g i (si , ai , y).
- The prior distribution p1 is a product distribution: for all s,
p1 (s) = ×i pi1 (si ),
for some distributions pi1 ∈ Δ(S i ).
- The transitions of player i’s state are independent of players −i’s private information:
for every i and y, every (si , ai , ti ), and pairs (s−i , α−i , t−i ), (s̃−i , α̃−i , t̃−i ),
psi ,s−i ,ai ,α−i (ti | y, t−i ) = psi ,s̃−i,ai ,α̃−i (ti | y, t̃−i ).
The second assumption ensures that the conditional belief of players −i about player i’s
state only depends on the public history (independently of the play of players −i). Along
with the third, it implies that the private states of the players are independently distributed
in any round n, conditional on the public history up to that round. As is customary with
IPV, this deﬁnition assumes that the factorization property holds, namely, player i’s stage
game payoﬀ only depends on a−i via y, although none of the proofs uses this property.
As discussed, there is no reason to set M i = S i × Ai × S i here, and so we ﬁx M i = S i
throughout (we nevertheless use the symbol M i instead of S i whenever convenient).
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Our purpose is to describe explicitly the asymptotic equilibrium payoﬀ set in the IPV
case. The feasible (long-run) payoﬀ set is deﬁned as


F := co v ∈ RI | v = Eμρ [r(s, a)], some policy ρ : M → A .
When deﬁning feasible payoﬀs, the restriction to deterministic policies rather than arbitrary
strategies is clearly without loss. Recall also that a public randomization device is assumed,
so that F is convex.

6.1

An Upper Bound on Bayes Nash Equilibrium Payoﬀs

Not all feasible payoﬀs can be Bayes Nash equilibrium payoﬀs, because types are private
and independently distributed. As is well known, incentive compatibility restricts the set of
decision rules that can be implemented in static Bayesian implementation. One can hardly
expect the state of aﬀairs to improve once transfers are further restricted to be continuation
payoﬀs of a Markovian game. Yet to evaluate the performance of truthful equilibria, we
must provide a benchmark.
To motivate this benchmark, consider ﬁrst the case in which the marginal distribution
over signals is independent of the states. That is, suppose for now that, for all (s, s̃, a, y),
ps,a (y) = ps̃,a (y),
so that the public signal conveys no information about the state proﬁle, as is the case under
perfect monitoring, for instance. Fix some direction λ ∈ Λ. What is the best Bayes Nash
equilibrium payoﬀ vector, if we aggregate payoﬀs according to the weights λ? If λi < 0, we
would like player i to reveal his state in order to use this information against his interests. Not
surprisingly, player i is unlikely to be forthcoming about this. This suggests distinguishing
players in the set I(λ) := {i : λi > 0} from the others. Deﬁne
k̄(λ) = max Eμρ [λ · r(s, a)] ,
ρ

where the maximum is over all policies ρ : ×i∈I(λ) S i → A (with the convention that ρ ∈ A
for I(λ) = ∅). Furthermore, let


V ∗ := ∩λ∈Λ v ∈ RI | λ · v ≤ k̄(λ) .
We call V ∗ the set of incentive-compatible payoﬀs. Clearly, V ∗ ⊆ F . Note also that V ∗
depends on the transition matrix only via the invariant distribution. It turns out that the
set V ∗ is an upper bound on the set of all equilibrium payoﬀ vectors.
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Lemma 2 The limit set of Bayes Nash equilibrium payoﬀs is contained in V ∗ .
Proof. Fix λ ∈ Λ. Fix also δ < 1 (and recall the prior p1 at time 1). Consider the
Bayes Nash equilibrium σ of the game (with discount factor δ) with payoﬀ vector v that
maximizes λ · v among all equilibria (where v i is the expected payoﬀ of player i given p1 ).
This equilibrium need not be truthful or in pure strategies. Consider i ∈
/ I(λ). Along with
−i
i
σ and p1 , player i’s equilibrium strategy σ deﬁnes a distribution over histories. Fixing σ −i ,
let us consider an alternative strategy σ̃ i where player i’s reports are replaced by realizations
of the public randomization device with the same distribution (round by round, conditional
on the realizations so far), and player i’s action is determined by the randomization device as
well, with the same conditional distribution (given the simulated reports) as σ i would specify
if this had been i’s report.25 The new proﬁle (σ −i , σ̃ i ) need no longer be an equilibrium of
the game. Yet, thanks to the IPV assumption, it gives players −i the same payoﬀ as σ and,
thanks to the equilibrium property, it gives player i a weakly lower payoﬀ. Most importantly,
the strategy proﬁle (σ −i , σ̃ i ) no longer depends on the history of types of player i. Clearly,
this argument can be applied to all players i ∈
/ I(λ) simultaneously, so that λ · v is lower
than the maximum inner product achieved over strategies that only depend on the history
of types in I(λ). Maximizing this inner product over such strategies is a standard Markov
decision problem, which admits a solution within the class of deterministic policies. Taking


δ → 1 yields that the limit set is included in v ∈ RI | λ · v ≤ k̄(λ) , and this is true for all
λ ∈ Λ.
It is worth emphasizing that this result does not rely on the choice of any particular
message space M.26 We deﬁne
ρ[λ] ∈

argmax
ρ:×i∈I(λ) S i →A

Eμρ [λ · r(s, a)]

(2)

to be any policy that achieves this maximum, and let Ξ := {ρ[λ] : λ ∈ Λ} denote the set of
such policies.
25

To be slightly more formal: in a given round, the randomization device selects a report for player i
according to the conditional distribution induced by σ i , given the public history so far. At the same time,
the device selects an action for player i according to the distribution induced by σ i , given the public history,
including reports of players −i and the simulated report for player i. The strategy σ̃ i plays the action
recommended by the device.
26
Incidentally, it appears that the role of V ∗ is new also in the context of static mechanism design with
transfers. There is no known exhaustive description of the decision rules that can be implemented under
IPV, but it is clear that the payoﬀs in V ∗ (replacing μ with the prior distribution in the deﬁnition) can be
achieved using the AGV mechanism on a subset of agents; conversely, no payoﬀ vector yielding a score larger
than k̄(λ) can be achieved, so that V ∗ provides a description of the achievable payoﬀ set in that case as well.
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Figure 3: Payoﬀs of Example 4
The set V ∗ can be a strict subset of F , as the following example shows.
Example 4. Actions do not aﬀect transitions. Each player i = 1, 2 has two states si =
si , s̄i , with c(si ) = 2, c(s̄i ) = 1. Rewards are given by Figure 3. (The interpretation is that
a pie of size 3 is obtained if at least one agent works; if both choose to work only half the
amount of work has to be put in by each worker. Their cost of working is ﬂuctuating.)
This game satisﬁes the IPV assumption. From one round the next, the state changes with
probability p, common but independent across players. Given that actions do not aﬀect
transitions, we can take it equal to p = 1/2 (i.i.d. types) for the sake of computing V ∗
and F , shown in Figure 4. Of course, each player can secure at least 3 − 2+1
= 32 by always
2
working, so the actual equilibrium payoﬀ set, taking into account the incentives at the action
step, is smaller.27
So far, the distribution of public signals has been assumed to be independent of states.
More information can be extracted from players when they cannot prevent public signals
from revealing part of it, at least statistically. States si and s̃i are indistinguishable, denoted
si ∼ s̃i , if for all s−i and all (a, y), psi ,s−i,a (y) = ps̃i ,s−i ,a (y). Indistinguishability deﬁnes a
partition of S i and we denote by [si ] the partition cell to which si belongs. If signals depend
on actions, this partition is non-trivial for at least one player. By deﬁnition, if [si ] = [s̃i ] there
exists s−i such that psi ,s−i,a = ps̃i,s−i ,a for some a ∈ A. Let D i = {(s−i , a)} ⊂ S −i × A denote
a selection of such states, along with the discriminating action proﬁle: for all [si ] = [s̃i ], there
exists (s−i , a) ∈ D i such that psi,s−i ,a = ps̃i ,s−i ,a .
More generally then, the best Bayes Nash equilibrium payoﬀ in the direction λ ∈ Λ
cannot exceed
k̄(λ) := max Eμρ [λ · r(s, a)] ,
ρ

27

In this particular example, the distinction between V ∗ and F turns out to be irrelevant once individual
rationality is taken into account. Giving a third action to each player that yields both players a payoﬀ of 0
independently of the state and the action of the opponent remedies this.
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Figure 4: Incentive-compatible and feasible payoﬀ sets in Example 4
where the maximum is now over all policies ρ : S → A such that if si ∼ s̃i and λi ≤ 0 then
ρ(si , ·) = ρ(s̃i , ·). Extending the deﬁnition of V ∗ to this more general deﬁnition of k̄, Lemma
2 remains valid. We retain the same notation for ρ[λ], the policies that achieve the extreme
points of V ∗ , and Ξ, the set of such policies.
Finally, a lower bound to V ∗ is also readily obtained. Let Extpo denote the (weak)
Pareto frontier of F . We write Extpu for the set of payoﬀ vectors obtained from pure stateindependent action proﬁles, i.e. the set of vectors v = Eμρ [r(s, a)] for some ρ that takes a
constant value in A. In their environment with action-independent transitions and perfect
monitoring, Escobar and Toikka show that all individually rational (as deﬁned below) payoﬀs
in co (Extpu ∪ Extpo ) are equilibrium payoﬀs (whenever this set has non-empty interior).
Indeed, the following is easy to show.
Lemma 3 It holds that co (Extpu ∪ Extpo ) ⊂ V ∗ .
In Example 4, this lower bound is tight, but this is not always the case.

6.2

Truth-telling

In this section, we ignore the action step and focus on the incentives of players to report
their type truthfully. That is, we focus on the revelation game.
27

The pair (ρ, x) is weakly truthful if it satisﬁes Deﬁnition 2 with two modiﬁcations: in
Step 1 of Deﬁnition 2, the requirement that truth-telling be uniquely optimal is dropped.
That is, it is only required that truth-telling be an optimal reporting strategy, albeit not
necessarily the unique one. In Step 2, the requirement that ρi be optimal is ignored. That
is, the policy ρ : S → A is ﬁxed.
A direction λ ∈ Λ is coordinate if it is equal to ei or −ei , where ei denotes the i-th
coordinate basis vector in RI . The direction λ is non-coordinate if λ = ±ei , that is, if it has
at least two nonzero coordinates. We ﬁrst show that we can ignore the constraint λ · x ≤ 0
in all non-coordinate directions.
Proposition 1 Let (ρ, x) be a weakly truthful pair. Fix a non-coordinate direction λ ∈ Λ.
Then there exists x̂ such that (ρ, x̂) is weakly truthful and λ · x̂ = 0.
Proposition 1 implies that (exact) budget-balance comes “for free” in all non-coordinate
directions. It is the undiscounted analogue of a result by AS, and its proof follows similar
steps.
Proposition 1 need not hold in coordinate directions. However, we can also assume that
λ · x(·) = 0 for λ = ±ei when considering the policies ρ[λ] ∈ Ξ: if λ = −ei , ρ[λ] is an action
proﬁle that is independent of the state proﬁle. Hence, incentives for weak truth-telling are
satisﬁed for x = 0; in the case λ = +ei , ρ[λ] is a policy that depends on i’s report only, yet
it is precisely i’s payoﬀ that is maximized. Here as well, incentives for weak truth-telling are
satisﬁed for x = 0.
Our next goal is to obtain a characterization of all policies ρ for which there exists x such
that (ρ, x) is weakly truthful.
Along with ρ and truthful reporting by players −i, a reporting strategy by player i, that
is, a map28 miρ : Ωpub × S i → Δ(M i ) from the previous public outcome and the current state
into a report, induces a unichain Markov chain over Ωpub ×S i ×M i , with transition function qρ
and with invariant measure πρi ∈ Δ(Ωpub ×S i ×M i ). We deﬁne the set Πiρ ⊂ Δ(Ωpub ×S i ×M i )
as all distributions πρi that satisfy the balance equation

πρi (ωpub , ti ) =
qρ (ωpub , ti | ω̄pub , si , mi )πρi (ω̄pub , si , mi ), all (ωpub , ti ),
(3)
ω̄pub ,si

and



πρi (ω̄pub , si , mi ) = μρ (ω̄pub , mi ).

(4)

si ∈[mi ]
28

Note that, under IPV, player i’s private information contained in ω̄ is not relevant for his incentives in
the current round, conditional on ω̄pub , si .
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where μρ (ω̄pub , mi ) is the probability assigned to (ω̄pub , mi ) by the invariant distribution μρ
under truth-telling (and ρ). Equation (4) states that πρi cannot be statistically distinguished
from truth-telling. As a consequence, it is not possible to prevent player i from choosing his
favorite element of Πiρ , as formalized by the next lemma. To state it, deﬁne


rρi (ω̄pub , si , mi ) := Es−i |ω̄pub r i (si , ρ(s−i , mi ))
as the expected reward of player i given his report, type and the previous public outcome
ω̄pub .
Lemma 4 Given a policy ρ, there exists x such (ρ, x) is weakly truthful if and only if for all
i, truth-telling maximizes


Eπ rρi (ω̄pub , si , mi )
(5)
over π ∈ Πiρ .
We apply Lemma 4 to the policies that achieve the extreme points of V ∗ . Fix λ ∈ Λ and
ρ = ρ[λ] ∈ Ξ. Plainly, truth-telling is optimal for any player i ∈
/ I(λ), as his reports do not
aﬀect the policy. As for a player i ∈ I(λ), note that if two of his reporting strategies are both
in Πiρ[λ] , the one that yields a higher expected payoﬀ to him (as deﬁned by (5)) also yields
a higher score: indeed, as long as they are both in Πiρ[λ] , they are equivalent from the point
of view of the other players. It then follows that the maximum score over weakly truthful
pairs (ρ, x) is equal to the maximum possible one, k̄(λ).
Lemma 5 Fix a direction λ ∈ Λ. Then the maximum score over weakly truthful (ρ, x) such
that λ · x ≤ 0 is given by k̄(λ).
The conclusion of this section is somewhat surprising: at least in terms of payoﬀs, there is
no possible gain (in terms of incentive-compatibility) from linking decisions (and restricting
attention to truthful strategies) beyond the simple class of policies and transfer functions
that we consider. In other words, ignoring individual rationality and incentives at the action
step, the set of “equilibrium” payoﬀs that we obtain is equal to the set of incentive-compatible
payoﬀs V ∗ . If players commit to actions, the “revelation principle” holds even if players do
not commit to future reports.
If transitions are action-independent, note that this means also that the persistence of
the Markov chain has no relevance for the set of payoﬀs that are incentive-compatible. (If
actions aﬀect transitions, even the feasible payoﬀ set changes with persistence, as it aﬀects
the extreme policies.) Note that this does not rely on any full support assumption on the
29

transition probabilities, although of course the unichain assumption is used (cf. Example 1
of Renault, Solan and Vieille that shows that this conclusion –that the invariant distribution
is a suﬃcient statistic for the set of limit incentive-compatible payoﬀs– does not hold when
values are interdependent).

6.3

Obedience and Individual Rationality

Recall that truth-telling incentives must be strict. This requires some minimal assumption
on preferences. To motivate it, consider the case in which player i’s types are i.i.d. over time.
If the vector r i (si , ·) can be written as cr i (s̄i , ·) + d, with s̄i = si , for some c, d ∈ R, c > 0,
then it is clearly impossible to provide incentives for player i to strictly prefer revealing that
his private state is si rather than s̄i .29 Similarly, if r i (si , a) is independent of a ∈ A, player i
does not care about the action proﬁle played in that period, and strict incentives cannot be
provided. This is a familiar result in repeated games, see Abreu, Dutta and Smith (1994):
with constant or equivalent utility functions, it is impossible to make truth-telling incentives
strict. It is necessary that, for at least two possibly mixed action proﬁles α, ᾱ ∈ A, player
i prefers α to ᾱ in state si , and ᾱ to α in state s̄i . Without the i.i.d. assumption, we have
more leeway, as preferences are deﬁned over inﬁnite streams of actions. We directly state
our assumption in terms of payoﬀ asymmetry.
i

i

i

i

Assumption 1 For all i, si = s̄i ∈ S i , there exists (as ,s̄ )n , (as̄ ,s )n ∈ AN such that


i i
i i
i i
i i
δ n r i (sn , asn ,s̄ ) − r i (sn , as̄n ,s ) > 0 > lim Es1 =s̄i
δ n r i (sn , asn ,s̄ ) − r i (sn , as̄n ,s ) .
lim Es1 =si
δ→1

δ→1

n≥1

n≥1

Assumption 1 implies the existence of |S i | lotteries over a set Γi of sequences {(akn )∞
n=1 : k =
1, . . . , |S i |(|S i | − 1)/2} such that each type of player i has a strictly preferred lottery (as
δ → 1) within that set, with no single lottery being the best one for two diﬀerent types. (See
Lemma 2 of Abreu, Dutta and Smith, 1994.) For simplicity we have stated Assumption 1 in
terms of action proﬁles, but we could as well assume that there exist two distributions over
sequences in AN that have the stated property. Let us now turn to monitoring.
Actions might be just as hard to keep track of as states. But there are well known
statistical conditions under which opportunistic behavior can be kept in check when actions
are imperfectly monitored. These conditions are of two kinds. First, unilateral deviations
must be detectable, at least when they are proﬁtable, so that punishments can be meted
29

It might make sense to identify si , s̄i if utilities are equivalent, and ask player i to report the equivalence
class. We do not pursue this here.
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out. Second, when such deviations pertain to players that matter for budget balance, they
must be identiﬁable, so that punishments involve surplus redistribution rather than surplus
destruction. Because the signal distribution might depend on the state proﬁle, the conditions
from repeated games must be slightly amended.
In what follows, ps,a refers to the marginal distribution over signals y ∈ Y only. (Because
types are conditionally independent, the states of players −i in round n + 1 are uninformative about ai , conditional on y.) Let Qi (s, a) := {pŝi ,s−i ,âi ,a−i : âi = ai , ŝi ∈ S i } be the
distributions over signals y induced by a unilateral deviation by i at the action step, whether
or not the reported state si corresponds to the true state ŝi or not. For simplicity, we make
the assumption on all pairs of states and actions, although of course only those that are used
in the construction matter.
Assumption 2 For all (s, a) ∈ S × A:
1. For all i = j, ps,a ∈
/ co (Qi (s, a) ∪ Qj (s, a));
2. For all i = j,
co ps,a ∪ Qi (s, a) ∩ co ps,a ∪ Qj (s, a) = {ps,a} .
This assumption states that deviations of players can be detected, as well as identiﬁed, even
if player i has “coordinated” his deviation at the reporting and action step.
Note that Assumption 2 reduces to Assumptions A1–A3 of Kandori and Matsushima
(1998) in the case of repeated games (with the caveat that Kandori and Matsushima apply
it to the relevant action proﬁles only).
Finally, lack of commitment curtails how low payoﬀs can be. Example 2 makes clear
that insisting on truth-telling restricts the ability to punish players, and that the minimum
equilibrium payoﬀ in truthful strategies can be bounded above the actual minmax payoﬀ.
Nevertheless, it should be clear that this minimum is no more than the state-independent
pure-strategy minmax payoﬀ
v i := min

max Eμ[ρi ,a−i ] [r i (si , a)].

a−i ∈A−i ρi :S i →Ai

Clearly, this is not the best punishment level one could hope for, even if it is the one used
in the literature. Nevertheless, as Escobar and Toikka eloquently describe, it coincides with
the actual minmax payoﬀ (deﬁned over all strategies available to players −i, see the next
section) in many interesting economic examples. It does in Example 4 as well, but not in
Example 2. The punishment level −k0 (−ei ) delivered by the optimization program P(−ei )
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can be strictly lower than this state-independent pure-strategy minmax payoﬀ, but there
seems to be no simple formula for it. Hence, in what follows, we use v i as our benchmark,
and let ρi denote a policy that achieves vi .
We may now state the main result of this section. Denote the set of incentive-compatible,
individually rational payoﬀs as


V ∗∗ := v ∈ V ∗ | v i ≥ vi , all i .
Theorem 3 Suppose that V ∗∗ has non-empty interior. Under Assumptions 1–2, the limit
set of equilibrium payoﬀs includes V ∗∗ .

6.4

A Characterization

The previous section has provided lower bounds on the asymptotic equilibrium payoﬀ set.
This section provides an exact characterization under stronger assumptions.
As mentioned, there are many examples in which the state-independent pure-strategy
minmax payoﬀ vi coincides with the “true” minmax payoﬀ


i
n−1 i
w := lim min max E (1 − δ)
δ rn ,
δ→1 σ−i

n≥1

σi

where the minimum is over the set of (independent) strategies by players −i. We denote by σ i
the limiting strategy proﬁle. (See Neyman 2008 for an analysis of the zero-sum undiscounted
game when actions do not aﬀect transitions.)
But the two do not coincide for all examples of economic interest. First, the stateindependent pure-strategy minmax payoﬀ rules out mixed strategies. Yet mixed strategies
play a key role in some applications, e.g. the literature on tax auditing. More disturbingly,
when vi > w i , it can happen that V ∗∗ = ∅. Theorem 3 becomes meaningless, as the
corresponding equilibria no longer exist. On the other hand, the set


W := v ∈ V ∗ | v i ≥ w i for all i
is never empty.30
As is also well known, even when attention is restricted to repeated games, there is
no reason to expect the punishment level w i to equal the mixed-strategy minmax payoﬀ
commonly used (that lies in between w i and vi ), as w i might only be obtained when players
30

To see this, note that the state-independent mixed minmax payoﬀ lies below the Pareto-frontier: clearly,
the score in direction λe = √1I (1, . . . , 1) of the payoﬀ vector minα−i maxρi :S i →Ai E[ri (si , a)] is less than k(λe ).
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−i use private strategies (depending on past action choices) that would allow for harder,
coordinated punishments than those assumed in the deﬁnition of the mixed-strategy minmax
payoﬀ. Private histories may allow players −i to correlate play unbeknownst to i. One special
case in which they do coincide is when monitoring has a product structure, which rules out
such correlation.31 As this is the class of monitoring structures for which the standard folk
theorem for repeated games is a characterization of (as opposed to a lower bound on) the
equilibrium payoﬀ set, we maintain this assumption throughout this section.
Deﬁnition 4 Monitoring has product structure if there are ﬁnite sets (Y i )Ii=1 such that Y =
×i Y i , and
ps,a (y) = ×i pisi ,ai (y i ),
for all y = (y 1 , . . . , y I ) ∈ Y , all (s, a).
As shown by FLM, product structure ensures that identiﬁability is implied by detectability,
and that no further assumptions are required on the monitoring structure to enforce payoﬀs
on the Pareto-frontier, hence to obtain a “Nash-threat” theorem. Our goal is to achieve
a characterization of the equilibrium payoﬀ set, so that an assumption on the monitoring
structure remains necessary. We make the following assumption, which could certainly be
reﬁned.
Assumption 3 For all i, (s, a),
ps,a ∈
/ co Qi (s, a).
Note that, given product structure, Assumption 3 is an assumption on pi only. We prove
that W characterizes the (Bayes Nash, as well as sequential) equilibrium payoﬀ set as δ → 1
in the IPV case. More formally:
Theorem 4 Assume that monitoring has the product structure, and that Assumptions 1
and 3 hold. If W has non-empty interior, the set of (Nash, sequential) equilibrium payoﬀs
converges to W as δ → 1.
As is clear from Example 2, this requires using strategies that are not truthful, at least
during “punishments.” 32 Nonetheless, we show that a slight extension of the set of strategies
considered so far, to allow for silent play during punishment-like phases, suﬃces.
31

The scope for wi to coincide with the mixed minmax payoﬀ is slightly larger, but not by much. See
Gossner and Hörner (2010) for a characterization.
32
We use quotation marks as there are no clearly deﬁned punishment phases in recursive constructions (as
in APS or here), unlike in the standard proof of the folk theorem under perfect monitoring.
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Unlike in repeated games, imposing product structure does not guarantee that the minmax strategy is stationary: players −i draw inferences from the public signal y i about player
i’s action, hence about his private state, which can be exploited to adjust the next punishment action. Our construction relies on an extension of Theorem 2, as well as an argument
inspired by Gossner (1995), based on approachability theory (Blackwell, 1956). Roughly
speaking, the argument is divided in two parts. First, one must extend Theorem 2 to allow
for “blocks” of T rounds, rather than single rounds, as the extensive form over which the
score is computed. This part is delicate; in particular, the directions −ei –for which such
aggregation is necessary– cannot be treated in isolation, as Λ \ {−ei } would no longer be
compact, a property that is important in the proof of Theorem 2. Second, considering such
a block in which player i, say, is “punished” (that is, a block corresponding to the direction
−ei ), one must devise transfers x at the end of the block, as a function of the public history,
that makes players −i willing to play the minmax strategy, or at least some strategy proﬁle
achieving approximately the same payoﬀ to player i. The diﬃculty, illustrated by Example
2, is that typically there are no transfers making player i indiﬀerent over a subset of actions
for diﬀerent types of his simultaneously; yet minmaxing might require precisely as much.
To ensure that the distribution over action proﬁles during the punishment phase matches
the theoretical one (computed using the realized actions taken by player i), we design a
statistical test that a player j = i can pass with very high probability (by conforming to the
minmax strategy, for instance), independently of the other players’ strategies; and that he
is very likely to fail if the distribution of his realized signals departs too much from the one
that his minmax strategy would yield.33 When testing player j, it is critical to condition on
player i’s realized signal, so as to incentivize player j to be unpredictable.

7

Correlated Types

We now consider the case of correlated types, as deﬁned by Assumption 5 below. As we
will see, applying Theorem 2 results in an extension of the static insights from Crémer and
McLean (1988) to the dynamic game.
As in the IPV case, we must distinguish truth-telling incentives from constraints imposed
by individual rationality and imperfect monitoring of actions. Here, we start with the latter.
Because V ∗ is no longer an upper bound on the Bayes Nash equilibrium payoﬀ set, we must
33

This is where the IPV assumption and product monitoring are used. It ensures that player j’s minmax
strategy can be taken to be independent of his private information, hence adapted to the public information.
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re-deﬁne the set of relevant policies Ξ as the set of policies that achieve extreme points
of F .34,35 These are simply the policies achieving the extreme points of the feasible (limit)
payoﬀ set.
As before, in the statement of assumptions on the monitoring structure, ps,a refers to the
marginal distribution over public signals only.
Assumption 2’(a) For all ρ ∈ Ξ, all s, a = ρ(s):
1. For all i = j, ps,a ∈
/ co (Qi (s, a) ∪ Qj (s, a));
2. For all i = j,
co ps,a ∪ Qi (s, a) ∩ co ps,a ∪ Qj (s, a) = {ps,a} .
Because the private states of players −i are no longer irrelevant when punishing player i
(both because values need not be private, and because their states are informative about i’s
state), we must redeﬁne the minmax payoﬀ of player i as
vi :=

min

max Eμρ [r i (s, a)],

ρ−i :S −i →A−i ρi :S→Ai

As before, we let ρi denote a policy that achieves this minmax payoﬀ.
Assumption 2’(b) For all i, for all s, a = ρi (s), j = i,
ps,a ∈
/ co Qj (s, a).
The purpose of these two assumptions is as in the IPV case: it ensures that transfers that
induce truth-telling taking as given compliance with a ﬁxed policy can always be augmented
in a budget-balanced fashion so as to ensure that this compliance is optimal, whether or not
a player deviates in the report he makes: with such an adjustment, even after an incorrect
report (at least in non-coordinate directions), a player ﬁnds it optimal to play as if his report
had been truthful. This is formally stated below.
Lemma 6 Under Assumptions 2’(a)–2’(b), it holds that:
- For all non-coordinate λ, there exists x : Ωpub ×Ωpub ×S → RI such that (i) λ·x(·) = 0,
(ii) for all i, if players −i report truthfully and play according to ρ−i [λ], then all bestreplies of i at the action step specify ai = ρi [λ](m) independently of mi .
34

If multiple policies achieve the maximum, Assumption 2’(a) has to be understood as asserting the
existence of a selection of policies satisfying the stated requirement.
35
To economize on new notation, in what follows we adopt the symbols used in Section 6 to denote the
corresponding –although slightly diﬀerent– quantities. Hopefully, no confusion will arise.
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- Given λ = +ei , there exists x : Ωpub × Ωpub × S → RI such that (i) λ · x(·) = 0,
(ii) for all j = i, if players −j report truthfully and play according to ρ−j [λ], then all
best-replies of j at the action step specify aj = ρj [λ](m) independently of mj ,(iii) if
players −i report truthfully and play according to ρ−i [λ], ρi [λ] is a best-reply for player
i after a truthful report mi . The same conclusions hold for λ = −ei and ρ = ρi .
We now turn to the players’ incentives to report truthfully. For simplicity, we assume
that the states are autocorrelated. More precisely, this is implied by Assumptions 4–5 below,
which cannot hold otherwise. For the case in which states are independently distributed over
time, the counterpart of Theorem 4 follows from a straightforward application of FL. To save
on notation, given Lemma 6, in what follows we drop player i’s previous action āi from his
report.
Throughout, ﬁx some policy ρ : S → A and assume that actions are determined by ρ
(that is, we take actions as given). Fix a player i and m̄, ā, ȳ. Having ﬁxed actions, recall
that a type of player i is a pair ζ i = (s̄i , si ). What evidence can be used to statistically test
whether player i is reporting truthfully his type? The states s−i that are announced, ﬁrst;36
the signal y (as the distribution of signals can depend on si ) second; and last, as explained
in Example 3, the next report t−i .
We may use Bayes’ rule to compute the distribution over (s−i , y, t−i ), conditional on the
past reports, actions and signal being m̄, ā, ȳ if player i’s past and current state are s̄i and
si . This distribution is denoted
m̄,ā,ȳ −i
q−i
(s , y, t−i | ζ i ).

Detecting deviations requires that diﬀerent reports induce diﬀerent distributions. We must
distinguish between directions λ = −ei and other directions. In directions −ei , budget
balance does not restrict the transfers that can be used to discipline players j = i, so that
detection is all that is needed. We assume
Assumption 4 For all i, ρ = ρi , all (m̄, ā, ȳ), for any j = i, ζ̂ j ∈ (S j )2 , it holds that
m̄,ā,ȳ −j
m̄,ā,ȳ −j
(s , y, t−j | ζ̂ j ) = co q−j
(s , y, t−j | ζ j ) : ζ j = ζ̂ j .
q−j

If types are independent over time, and signals y do not depend on states (as is the case with
perfect monitoring, for instance), this reduces to the requirement that the matrix with entries
36

Of course, players −i’s reports are richer, as they are pairs (s̄−i , s−i ) themselves. But the information
contained in s̄−i is not useful in testing i’s report, because player i already knows s̄−i , assuming that −i
have reported truthfully their states in the previous round.
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psj (s−j ) have full row rank, a standard condition in mechanism design (see d’Aspremont,
Crémer and Gérard-Varet (2003) and d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1982)’s condition B).
Here, beliefs can also depend on player j’s previous state, s̄j , but fortunately, we can also
use player −j’s future state proﬁle, t−j , to statistically distinguish player j’s types.
As is well known, Assumption 4 ensures that for any minmaxing policy ρi , truth-telling
is Bayesian incentive compatible: there exists transfers xj (ω̄pub , (m, y), t−j ) for which truthtelling is optimal for j = i. This also holds for player i, as his report has no consequence on
the actions played by the other players, and he is playing his (dynamic) best-reply.
In non-coordinate directions, statistical detection must be combined with budget balance,
which requires statistical discrimination. As is standard, it is suﬃcient to consider pairwise
directions (that is, weights λ ∈ Λ for which two entries are non-zero), or, to put it diﬀerently,
pairs of players i, j.
Stating the assumption requires some more notation.37 We start with the joint distribution
q m̄,ā,ȳ (ζ, y, t),
over triples (ζ, y, t), computed using Bayes rule under the assumption that m̄ was truthful.
Next, we must consider the distribution over such triples when player i uses some arbitrary
reporting strategy when announcing his type ζ i = (s̄i , si ). Such a strategy is a map from (S i )2

into (S i )2 , which can be represented by non-negative numbers ci = ciζ i ζ̂ i , with ζ̂ i ciζ i ζ̂ i = 1
for all ζ i . The interpretation is that ciζ i ζ̂ i is the probability with which ζ̂ i is reported when
player i’s type is ζ i . Truth-telling obtains under a particular reporting strategy, denoted ĉi :
namely, for all ζ i , ciζ i ζ i = 1.
Given the prior distribution q m̄,ā,ȳ , a proﬁle c = (ci )i∈I , deﬁnes a new distribution π m̄,ā,ȳ
over (ζ, y, t), according to
π m̄,ā,ȳ (ζ̂, y, t | c) =


ζ

q m̄,ā,ȳ (ζ, y, t) ×j cjζ j ζ̂ j .

Under truth-telling, this distribution π m̄,ā,ȳ (· | ĉ) coincides with q. Of interest is the set of
distributions that player i can induce by unilateral deviations in his report. This set is


Ri (m̄, ā, ȳ) := π m̄,ā,ȳ (· | ci , ĉ−i ) : ci = ĉi .
Again, the following is the adaptation of the assumption of Kandori and Matsushima (1998)
to the current context.
37

Some of the notation follows Kosenok and Severinov (2008).
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Assumption 5 For all ρ ∈ Ξ, all (m̄, ā, ȳ),
1. For all pairs (i, j), i = j, π m̄,ā,ȳ (· | ĉ) ∈
/ co (Ri (m̄, ā, ȳ) ∪ Rj (m̄, ā, ȳ));
2. For all (i, j), i = j,
co π m̄,ā,ȳ (· | ĉ) ∪ Ri (m̄, ā, ȳ) ∩ co π m̄,ā,ȳ (· | ĉ) ∪ Rj (m̄, ā, ȳ) = {π m̄,ā,ȳ (· | ĉ)} .
Assumption 5 combines two assumptions: any deviation by a player is detectable (π m̄,ā,ȳ (· |
ĉ) ∈
/ co Ri (m̄, ā, ȳ)), and unilateral deviations by two players are distinguishable (this is
Assumption 5.2). This second part is equivalent to the assumption of weak identiﬁability in
Kosenok and Severinov (2008) for two players (whose Lemma 2 can be directly applied). The
reason it is required for any pair of players (unlike in Kosenok and Severinov) is that we must
obtain budget-balance also for vectors λ ∈ Λ with only two non-zero positive coordinates
(a stronger requirement than with more nonzero positive coordinates, as it restricts the set
of players that can absorb a deﬁcit or a surplus). The full strength of Assumption 5.1 is
required (as in Kandori and Matsushima in their context) because we must also consider
directions λ ∈ Λ with only two non-zero coordinates whose signs are opposite.38
We let


V ∗∗ := v ∈ F | v i ≥ v i , all i
denote the feasible and “individually rational” payoﬀ set. It is then routine to show:
Theorem 5 Assume that V ∗∗ has non-empty interior. Under Assumptions 2’(a)–2’(b),
4–5, the limit set of truthful equilibrium payoﬀs includes V ∗∗ .
As in the static case, Assumptions 4–5 are generically satisﬁed if |S −i | ≥ |S i | for all
i.39 Recall that, if these assumptions fail, it might be useful to take into account future
observations. Future signals (reports by other players, in particular) are useful in statistically
identifying the current state. Example 3 illustrates how powerful this channel can be.
38

See also Hörner, Takahashi and Vieille (2013). One easy way to understand this is in terms of the cone
spanned by the vectors π m̄,ā,ȳ (· | ci , ĉ−i ) and pointed at π m̄,ā,ȳ (· | ĉ). The ﬁrst assumption is equivalent
to any two such cones only intersecting at 0; and the second one states that any cone intersected with the
opposite cone (of another player) also only intersect at 0. When λi > 0 > λj , we can rewrite the constraint
λxi + λj xj = 0 as λi xi + (−λj )(−xj ) = 0 and the expected transfer of a player as p(· | cj )xj (·) = (−p(· |
cj ))(−xj (·)), so the condition for (λi , λj ) is equivalent to the condition for (λi , −λj ) if one “replaces” the
vectors p(· | cj ) with −p(· | cj ).
39
Generically, for Assumption 4, it suﬃces that |S −i |2 ≥ |S i |2 for all i, while Assumption 5 calls for
|S i × S −i |2 ≥ |S i |2 + |S j |2 − 1 for all pairs (i, j), which is satisﬁed if |S i × S j |2 ≥ |S i |2 + |S j |2 − 1, that is,
(|S i |2 − 1) × |S j |2 ≥ |S i |2 − 1.
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Conclusion

This paper has considered a class of equilibria in games with private and imperfectly persistent information. While the structure of equilibria has been assumed to be relatively simple,
to preserve tractability –in particular, we have mostly focused on truthful equilibria– it has
been shown, perhaps surprisingly, that in the case of independent private values this is not
restrictive as far as incentives go: all that transfers depend on are the current and the previous report. This conﬁrms a rather natural intuition: in terms of equilibrium payoﬀs at least
(and as far as incentive-compatibility is concerned), there is nothing to gain from aggregating information beyond transition counts. In the case of correlated values, we have shown
how the standard insights from static mechanism design with correlated values generalize; in
this case as well, the standard “genericity” conditions (in terms of numbers of states) suﬃce,
provided next round’s reports by a player’s opponent are used.
Open questions remain. As explained, the payoﬀ set identiﬁed in Theorem 2 is a subset
of the set of truthful equilibria. As our characterization in the IPV case when monitoring has
a product structure makes clear, this theorem can be extended to yield equilibrium payoﬀ
sets that are larger than the truthful equilibrium payoﬀ set, but without such tweaking, it is
unclear how large the gap is. If possible, an exact characterization of the truthful equilibrium
payoﬀ set (as δ → 1) would be very useful. In particular, this would provide us with a better
understanding of the circumstances under which existence obtains. It is striking that it does
in the two important cases that are well-understood in the static case: independent private
values and correlated types. Given how little is known in static mechanism design when
neither assumption is satisﬁed, perhaps one should not hope for too much in the dynamic
case. Instead, one might hope to prove directly that such equilibria exist in large classes
of games, such as games with known-own payoﬀs (private values, without the independence
assumption).
A diﬀerent but equally important question is what can be said about the dynamic
Bayesian game under alternative assumptions on the communication opportunities. At one
extreme, one might like to know what can be achieved without communication; at the other
extreme, how to extend the analysis to the case in which a mediator is available.
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A

Proof of Theorem 2

The proof is inspired by FLM but there are complications arising from incomplete information. We let Z be a compact set included in the interior of H0 , and pick η > 0 small enough
so that the η-neighborhood Zη := {z ∈ RI , d(z, Z) ≤ η} is also contained in the interior of
H0 . We will prove that Zη is included in the set of sequential equilibrium payoﬀs, when δ is
close enough to one.

A.1

Preliminaries

Given λ ∈ Λ, and since Zη is contained in the interior of H0 , one has maxz∈Zη λ · z < k(λ).
Thus, one can ﬁnd a feasible triple (v, ρ, x) in P(λ) such that maxz∈Zη λ · z < λ · v and
λ · x(·) < 0. Using the compactness of Λ, Lemma 7 below then follows.
Lemma 7 There exists ε0 > 0 and a ﬁnite set S0 of triples (v, ρ, x) with v ∈ RI and
(ρ, x) ∈ C0 such that the following holds. For every direction λ ∈ Λ, there is (v, ρ, x) ∈ S0
feasible in P0 (λ) and s.t. maxz∈Zη λ · z + ε0 < λ · v.
We let κ0 ∈ R be large enough so that r ≤ κ0 , x ≤ κ0 /2, θρ,r+x  ≤ κ0 /3 and
z − v ≤ κ0 /2 for each (v, ρ, x) ∈ S0 and every z ∈ Zη .40
We quote without proof the following classical result, which relies on the smoothness of
the boundary of Zη (see Lemma 6 in HSTV for a related statement).
Lemma 8 Given ε > 0, there exists ζ̄ > 0 such that the following holds. For every z ∈ Zη
there exists a direction λ ∈ Λ such that if w ∈ RI satisﬁes w − z ≤ ζ and λ · w ≤ λ · z − εζ
for some ζ < ζ̄, then w ∈ Zη .
Let an admissible pair (ρ, x) ∈ C0 , a player i ∈ I and (ω̄pub , s̄i , āi ) be given. Given si ∈ S i ,
we denote by γ i (ω̄pub , (s̄i , āi , si ) → mi ) the highest (interim) payoﬀ of player i in the decision
problem D i (ω̄pub , s̄i , āi ), when his state is si and when reporting mi ∈ M i . Since (ρ, x) ∈ C0 ,
truth-telling is uniquely optimal, so there exists νρ,x > 0 such that
νρ,x + γ i (ω̄pub , (s̄i , āi , si ) → mi ) < γ i (ω̄pub , (s̄i , āi , si ) → (s̄i , āi , si ))
whenever mi = (s̄i , āi , si ). We set ν := min(v,ρ,x)∈S0 νρ,x > 0.
40

The unit sphere is endowed with the L1 -norm. All other norms are supremum norms.
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(6)

We let ε1 ∈ (0, ε0) be arbitrary, set ε := ε1 /2κ0 and then let ζ̄ be given by Lemma 8.
Next, we pick β ∈ (0, 1), and let δ̄ < 1 be large enough so that for all δ ≥ δ̄ (i) (1 − δ) ≤ ξδ,
ξ
ν
, where ξ = (1 − δ)β .
(ii) 2κ0 δξ ≤ ε0 − ε1 (iii)
≤
1−ξ
5κ0

A.2

Strategies

We let the initial state proﬁle be commonly known and equal to s1 ∈ S. The p.r.d. is ignored
in round 1.
We let a payoﬀ vector z∗ ∈ Zη , and a discount factor δ ≥ δ̄ be given. We here deﬁne a
strategy proﬁle σ with a payoﬀ equal to z∗ in the δ-discounted game, which we next show to
be a sequential equilibrium (when supplemented with appropriate beliefs).
The play is partitioned into blocks of random duration. The durations of the successive
blocks are i.i.d., and follow a geometric distribution of parameter ξ. The random decision
to start a new block is made by the public randomizing device. Speciﬁcally, in each round
n, the device determines whether to start a new block or not, with respective probabilities
ξ and 1 − ξ.
With each block k is associated a direction λ[k] ∈ Λ, and the triple (v[k], ρ[k], x[k]) ∈ S0
associated to λ[k] by Lemma 7. The direction λ[k] is determined in the ﬁrst round τk of
block k, based on the available public history, including reports submitted in round τk .
The exact updating process is reminiscent of that of FLM. It is best described by introducing two “target” payoﬀs w[k], z[k] (instead of one in FLM and HSTV), with w[k] ∈ Zη
for all k.41
Given the public history up to round τk+1 = n + 1, the target w[k + 1] is deﬁned by
w̃n+1 = ξw[k + 1] + (1 − ξ)z[k],

(7)

where

1
1−δ
1−δ
w̃n+1 := z[k] −
(8)
v[k] +
x[k](ωpub,n−1 , ωpub,n , mc,n+1).
δ
δ
δ
Then, we let λ[k + 1] ∈ Λ be one of the directions associated to w[k + 1] by Lemma 8, pick
41

The modiﬁed target z[k] will be obtained from w[k] by adding a correcting term. The role of the
correction is to align exactly the incentives in the discounted game with switching blocks with those in the
“limit” optimization program P(λ), by adjusting for the fact that the relative values depend on the policy
being implemented, and on the discount factor. There is no need for such a correction in repeated/stochastic
games.
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(ρ[k + 1], x[k + 1], v[k + 1]) ∈ S0 using Lemma 7, and set



1−δ
θ[k](ωpub,n , mn+1 ) − θ[k + 1](ωpub,n , mn+1,c ) , (9)
z[k+1] := w[k+1]+(1−δ)
1+
δξ
where θ[k] := θρ[k],r+x[k] and θ[k + 1] := θρ[k+1],r+x[k+1].
The construction is initialized with w[1] = z∗ , θ[0] = 0, and an arbitrary pair (ωpub,0 , m1 ) ∈
Ωpub × M, where ωpub,0 is consistent with ρ[1], and m1 is consistent with ωpub,0 and s1 .42
In FLM, the target payoﬀ z is updated every round. In HSTV, it is updated every n
rounds with n > 1, to account for changing states. Here instead, the target payoﬀ is updated
at random times. The fact that ξ is much larger than 1 − δ ensures that successive target
payoﬀs lie in Zη . The fact that ξ vanishes as δ → 1 ensures that the expected duration of a
block increases to +∞ as δ → 1.
That this recursive construction is well-deﬁned follows from Lemma 9 below.
Lemma 9 One has w[k] ∈ Zη , for all k (and following any public history).
Proof. Assume w[k] ∈ Zη ,43 and note that w[k] − z[k] ≤ κ0 (1 − δ). By (7) and (8),
ξ(w[k + 1] − z[k]) = w̃τk+1 − z[k] =
so that
w[k + 1] − w[k] =

1−δ
(z[k] − v[k] + x[k]) ,
δ

1−δ
(z[k] − v[k] + x[k]) + (z[k] − w[k]) .
δξ

Thus,
w[k + 1] − w[k] ≤ 2
Set ζ := 2

(1 − δ)
κ0 .
δξ

(1 − δ)
κ0 . Note that
δξ
λ[k] · (w[k + 1] − w[k]) ≤ −ε0 ×

1−δ
+ (1 − δ)κ0 ≤ −εζ
δξ

(where the last inequality uses κ0 δξ ≤ ε0 − ε1 ). The result follows from Lemma 8, by the
choice of λ[k] and since ζ < ζ̄.
42

Note that w[1] pins down λ[1], (v[1], ρ[1], x[1]) and θ[1].
Here and elsewhere, we view w[k] as a random variable which is measurable w.r.t. the public information
available at the action step in round τk .
43
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We denote by Tn = (zn , wn , ρn , xn , vn , θn ) the family of all relevant variables in round n.
Thus, wn = w[k], ρn = ρ[k], etc., if τk ≤ n < τk+1 . We stress that Tn is known only after the
output of the randomizing device has been observed in round n.
Under σ, a player always reports truthfully at the reporting step (even if a deviation from
σ was observed in the past), and, at the action step, plays according to the mixed action ρn
whenever he reported truthfully his current state.
Fix now a player i, and a private history hin ∈ Hni × S i × M up to the action step in round
n. Assume ﬁrst that his currently reported state is correct: mic,n = sin . Since the belief of
−i
player i assigns probability one to s−i
n = mc,n , his continuation payoﬀ under σ is well-deﬁned,
and only depends on ωpub,n−1, mn and on Tn .44 We denote it by γσi (ωpub,n−1 , mn ; Tn ).
If instead mic,n = sin , we let σ i prescribe any action ai which maximizes the discounted
sum of the current payoﬀ and of expected continuation payoﬀs, that is, the expectation of
i
i
(1 − δ)r i (sn , (a−i
n , a )) + δγσ (ωpub,n , mn+1 ; Tn+1 ),
−i
i
−i
−i i
where a−i
i , ωpub,n = (mn , yn ), mn+1 = (sn , (an , a ), sn+1 )
n ∼ ρ (mc,n , sn ), (yn , sn+1 ) ∼ psn ,a−i
n ,a
and the expectation is taken over yn , mn+1 and Tn+1 .

Theorem 2 follows from Q1 and Q2 below.
Q1 For given T = (z, w, ρ, x, v, θ), one has γσ (ω̄pub , m; T ) = z + (1 − δ)θ(ω̄pub , m) for every
(ω̄pub , m) ∈ Ωpub × M.45
In particular, the expected payoﬀ induced by σ is equal to z∗ .
Q2 The proﬁle σ is a sequential equilibrium.

A.3

Proof of Q1

The rationale behind the twisted recursive formula (9) is the simple observation below. We
place ourselves right before the p.r.d. is observed in round n + 1.
Lemma 10 For any public history hpub,n+1 including reports mn+1 in round n + 1, one has
w̃n+1 (hpub,n+1 )+

1−δ
θn (ωpub,n , mn+1 ) = E[zn+1 (hpub,n+1 )+(1−δ)θn+1(ωpub,n , mn+1 )]. (10)
δ

44

This is true even if ωpub,n−1 and mn are inconsistent.
The payoﬀ vector γσ (ωpub , m; T ) is only deﬁned for sets T which can possibly arise along the play, and
the equality in the Proposition thus only holds for those.
45
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Recall that w̃n+1 is given by (7) and is measurable w.r.t. the public information available
before the random device is observed in round n + 1. The expectation in (10) is taken with
respect to the random output of the p.r.d., and the equality is an algebraic identity based
on the updating formulas (7) and (8).
Proof. Let hpub,n+1 be given, and let k denote the current block: τk < n + 1 ≤ τk+1 .
For clarity, we drop the arguments hpub,n+1 , ωpub,n and mn+1 below. With probability 1 − ξ,
Tn+1 = Tn and with probability ξ, zn+1 is given by (9). Thus,
E[zn+1 + (1 − δ)θn+1 ] = (1 − ξ) (zn + (1 − δ)θn )





1−δ
θn − θn+1 + (1 − δ)θn+1
+ξ w[k + 1] + (1 − δ) 1 +
δξ



1−δ
= w̃n+1 + (1 − δ) (1 − ξ) + ξ 1 +
θn
δξ
1−δ
= w̃n+1 +
θn .
δ
We now place ourselves at the action step in round n.
Lemma 11 Let hin be a private history of player i up to the action step in round n such
that mic,n = sin . Denote by hpub,n the public part of hin . One has
zni (hpub,n ) + (1 − δ)θni (ωpub,n−1 , mn ) =
i
i
(hpub,n+1) + (1 − δ)θn+1
(ωpub,n , mn+1 ) ].
E[(1 − δ)r i (sn , an ) + δ zn+1

Here, the expectation is taken over an and hpub,n+1 ,46 and is computed given the belief
held by player i at hin , assuming all players play σ from hin on. More concisely, we write


i
i
zni + (1 − δ)θni = E (1 − δ)rni + δ zn+1
+ (1 − δ)θn+1
.

Proof. Since (vn , ρn , xn ) ∈ S0 , and since θn = θρn ,r+xn , one has


i
vni (hpub,n ) + θni (ωpub,n−1 , mn ) = E r i (sn , an ) + xin (ωpub,n−1 , ωpub,n , s−i
)
+
θ
(ω
,
m
)
.
pub,n
n+1
n+1
n
(11)
46

hpub,n+1 is the public information available at the action step in round n + 1, and therefore also includes
the outcome of the p.r.d. in round n + 1.
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Omitting again all arguments, we rewrite (11) as



1−δ i
1−δ i
i
i
i
i
.
vn + (1 − δ)θn = E (1 − δ)rn + δ vn +
xn +
θ
δ
δ n
Adding zni − vni on both sides yields



1 i
1−δ i
1−δ i
i
i
i
i
i
zn + (1 − δ)θn = E (1 − δ)rn + δ vn + (zn − vn ) +
xn +
θ
δ
δ
δ n


1−δ i
i
i
= E (1 − δ)rn + δ(w̃n+1 +
θ )
δ n


i
i
+ (1 − δ)θn+1
) .
= E (1 − δ)rni + δ(zn+1
where the last equality holds by Lemma 10.
For later use, we note that, by the best-reply property of ρin , the equality (11) still holds
(resp. a weak inequality ≤ holds) if the mixed action ρin (mc,n ) is replaced by any action ai
in its support (resp. not in its support). This implies that, when an arbitrary action ain is
substituted to ρin (mc,n ) when taking expectations, the conclusion of the lemma still holds
with equality or a weak inequality ≤, depending on whether ai belongs to the support of
ρin (mc,n ) or not.
In probabilistic terms, Lemma 11 amounts to
zn + (1 − δ)θn = Eσ [(1 − δ)rn + δ (zn+1 + (1 − δ)θn+1 ) | Hpub,n ] , Pσ − a.s.,
where Hpub,n is the σ-algebra corresponding to the public information available after the
p.r.d. is observed in round n.47
Of course, the continuation payoﬀs γσ (ωpub,n−1 , mn ; Tn ) also satisfy the recursive equation
γσ (ωpub,n−1 , mn ; Tn ) = Eσ [(1 − δ)rn + δγσ (ωpub,n , mn+1 ; Tn+1 ) | Hpub,n ] .
Since all quantities are bounded, this implies that
γσ (ωpub,n−1 , mn ; Tn ) = zn (hpub,n ) + (1 − δ)θn (ωpub,n−1, mn ),

(12)

for every n and every public history hpub,n of positive probability given σ, as desired.
47

Since Hpub,n is ﬁnite, the statement actually means that the equality holds for every hpub,n of positive
probability under σ.
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A.4

Proof of Q2

Fix a player i. Note ﬁrst that, by construction, player i has no proﬁtable one-step deviation
at the action step following a lie (mic,n = sin ). Using the remark following the proof of Lemma
11, this is also true following a truthful report.
Let now hin ∈ Hni × S i be an arbitrary private history of player i at the reporting step in
round n. We will prove that truth-telling is optimal. The objective of player i is to pick the
report min that maximizes


E (1 − δ)rni + δγσi (ωpub,n , mn+1 ; Tn+1 ) ,
where the expectation is computed given the belief of player i, when facing σ −i , as a function
of min . By Q1, the expectation is also equal to


i
i
+ (1 − δ)θn+1
(ωpub,n , mn+1 ) ,
E (1 − δ)rni + δ zn+1
which using Lemma 10 is equal to


i
+ (1 − δ)θni .
E (1 − δ)rni + δ w̃n+1
As in the proof of Lemma 11, the latter expectation is also given by


i
i
−i
i
i
i
(1 − δ)E r i (sn , ρ(s−i
n , mn )) + xn (ωpub,n−1 , ωpub,n , sn+1 ) + θn (ωpub,n , sn+1 ) + E[zn − (1 − δ)vn ].
(13)
(Beware that we are taking expectations at the reporting step in round n: Tn is not known
at hin , hence the expectation over zni .)
We thus need to prove that the expectation in (13) is maximal when reporting truthfully.
Given an untruthful report min , we will compare the expectation, denoted Elie, when reporting min to the expectation Etruth when reporting truthfully. We condition on the outcome of
the public randomizing device. With probability 1 − ξ, the current block continues at least
to round n + 1, so that Tn = Tn−1 . Since (vn−1 , ρn−1 , xn−1 ) ∈ S0 (and since the belief of
player i at hin is deduced from ρn−1 ), the conditional Etruth exceeds the conditional Elie by
at least (1 − δ)ν.
With probability ξ, the play switches to a new block in round n. Conditional on switching,
lying may possibly improve both expectations on the right-hand side of (13). Yet, the gain
in (1 − δ)E[rni + xin + θni ] is of at most 2κ0 (1 − δ), and the gain in E[zni − (1 − δ)vni ] is, given
(9) and the choice of δ̄, of at most 3κ0 (1 − δ).48
48

Indeed, since xi (·, mc ) is independent of mic , the report min does not inﬂuence w̃n+1 .
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Hence,
Etruth − Elie ≥ (1 − ξ) × ν(1 − δ) − ξ × 5κ0 (1 − δ),
which is nonnegative since

B

ν
ξ
≤
.
1−ξ
5κ0

First Proofs for Independent Private Values

Proof of Lemma 3. Note that the equality λ · Eμρ [r(s, a)] ≤ k̄(λ) trivially holds for each
constant policy ρ = a ∈ A and λ ∈ Λ.
Let λ ∈ Λ. Suppose ﬁrst that λ ≤ 0. Consider the vector v ∈ Extpo that maximizes
λ · v, and the corresponding policy ρ. This policy implements the distribution Eμρ [ρ(s)] in
Δ(A). Consider the constant policy that uses the public randomization device to replicate
this distribution (independently of the reports). The IPV assumption ensures that all players
are weakly worse oﬀ. Hence k̄(λ) ≥ λ · v. Suppose next that λi > 0 for some i ∈ I. Again,
consider the vector v ∈ Extpo that maximizes λ · v. Because v ∈ Extpo , v also maximizes
λ̂ · v over v ∈ Extpo , for some λ̂ ≥ 0, λ̂ ∈ Λ, with λ̂i = 0 whenever λi < 0. Such a vector is
achieved by a policy that only depends on (si )i∈J
/ , because of private values. Hence again,
k̄(λ) ≥ λ · v.
This implies co (Extpu ∪ Extpo ) ⊂ {v ∈ Ri : λ · v ≤ k̄(λ)}, as desired.

B.1

Proof of Proposition 1

Given a policy ρ : S → ×i∈I Δ(Ai ), we denote by pρ the transition probability over Ωpub × S i ,
induced by ρ and truth-telling. More generally, we use the notation pρ whenever expectations/laws should be computed under the assumption that states are truthfully reported,
actions chosen according to ρ, and transitions determined using p. For instance, pρ (s−i | ω̄pub )
is the (conditional) law of s−i under ps̄,ρ(s̄) , given ȳ. Given the IPV assumption, it is thus
×j =i pj (sj | s̄j , ρj (s̄), ȳ).
Fix a weakly truthful pair (ρ, x), with ρ : S → ×i∈I Δ(Ai ) and x : Ωpub × S → RI . For
i ∈ I, (ω̄pub , si ) ∈ Ωpub × S i , set
ξ i (ω̄pub , si ) := Es−i ∼pρ (·|ω̄pub ) [xi (ω̄pub , s−i , si )].
Plainly, the pair (ρ, ξ) is weakly truthful as well.
The next lemma is the long-run analog of a key step in the proof of Proposition 2 in AS.
The logic of the proof is identical.
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Lemma 12 Deﬁne x̃ : Ωpub × S → RI by
i
i
(ω̄pub , si ) − Es̃i ∼pρ (·|ω̄pub ) [θρ,ξ
(ω̄pub , s̃i )].
x̃i (ω̄pub , s)(= x̃i (ω̄pub , si )) = θρ,ξ

(14)

Then (ρ, x̃) is weakly truthful.
Proof.
i
(·) = x̃i (·) (up to an additive constant, as usual). It suﬃces to
We ﬁrst argue that θρ,x̃
prove that x̃i solves the system


x̃i (ω̄pub , si ) = x̃i (ω̄pub , si ) + E(ωpub ,ti )∼pρ (·|ωpub,si ) x̃i (ωpub , ti ) , for all (ω̄pub , si ).
But this follows from the fact that


Epρ (·|s)[x̃i (ωpub , ti )] = Ey∼pρ (·|s) Et∼pρ (·|ωpub) x̃i (ωpub , ti ) = 0.
Next, ﬁx i ∈ I, and (ω̄ i , s̄i , āi ). Since (ρ, ξ) is weakly truthful, for each si ∈ S i , the expectation
of
i
i
r i (si , ρ(s−i , mi )) + ξ i (ω̄pub , mi ) + θρ,r
(ωpub , t) + θρ,ξ
(ωpub , t)
(15)
is maximized for mi = si .49
To prove that (ρ, x̃) is weakly truthful, we need to prove that the expectation of
i
i
r i (si , ρ(s−i , mi )) + x̃i (ω̄pub , mi ) + θρ,r
(ωpub , t) + θρ,x̃
(ωpub , t)

(16)

i
= x̃i , and the deﬁnition of x̃i , the
is maximized for mi = si as well. Fix mi ∈ M i . Using θρ,x̃
expression in (16) is equal to
i
i
i
i
r i (si , ρ(s−i , mi ))+θρ,ξ
(ω̄pub , mi )+θρ,r
(ωpub , t)+θρ,ξ
(ωpub , ti )−Eti ∼pρ (·|ωpub ) θρ,ξ
(ωpub , ti ), (17)
i
(ω̄pub , ti ), which does not depend on mi .
up to the constant Eti ∼pρ (·|ω̄pub ) θρ,ξ
i
Next, observe that by deﬁnition of θρ,ξ
, one has
i
i
(ω̄pub , mi ) = ξ i (ω̄pub , mi ) + E(ωpub ,ti )∼pρ (·|ω̄pub,mi ) θρ,ξ
(ωpub , ti ),
θρ,ξ

again up to a constant that does not depend on mi .
Thus, the expectations of (16) and (15) diﬀer by a constant, so that the weak truthfulness
of (ρ, x̃) follows from that of (ρ, ξ).
49

For concreteness, the expectation is to be computed as follows. First, s−i is drawn according to the belief
of i which, given the IPV assumption, is equal to pρ (· | ω̄pub ); next, (y, t) is drawn according to ps,ρ(s−i ,mi ) ,
and ωpub = (s−i , mi , y).

52

Corollary 6 Let μij ∈ R be arbitrary. For i ∈ I, set

x̄i (ω̄pub , m) = x̃i (ω̄pub , mi ) +
μij x̃j (ω̄pub , mj ).
j =i

Then (ρ, x̄) is weakly truthful.
Proof. It is enough to check that, for any ω̄pub and j = i, the expectation of θρ,x̃j (ωpub , s̃j ) =
x̃j (ωpub , s̃j ) does not depend on mi . But this expectation is zero (as in the proof of Proposition 2 in AS).
Proof of Proposition 1. Let (ρ, x) be weakly truthful. Since λ is not a unit vector, there

exists a solution to the system λi +
λj μji = 0 (i ∈ I). Apply Lemma 12 and Corollary 6
j =i

with this choice of μij . Then (ρ, x̄) is weakly truthful and λ · x̄(·) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 4. Focus on a player i and ﬁx a pair (ρ, x) with50 ρ : S → A and
x = Ωpub × Ωpub → RI .
Consider the MDP, deduced from the game, in which player i only chooses in round n
i
which state min to report, players −i report truthfully, actions are set to an = ρ(s−i
n , mn ),
and the reward is set to r i (sin , an ) + xi (ωpub,n−1 , ωpub,n ).
This MDP M is best viewed as an MDP in which (i) the state space is Ωpub × S i with
elements (ω̄pub , si ) (interpreted as the public outcome in the previous round and the current
state of player i), (ii) the action set is M i = S i , (iii) transitions (still denoted p) are deduced
from p and ρ in the obvious way, and (iv) the reward induced by action mi in state (ω̄pub , si )
is rρi ((ω̄pub , si ), mi ) + xiρ ((ω̄pub , si ), mi ) where
rρi ((ω̄pub , si ), mi ) = Es−i ∼p(·|ω̄pub) r i (si , ρ(s−i , mi )),
and
xiρ (ω̄pub , si , mi ) = Es−i∼p(·|ω̄pub),y∼ps,ρ(s−i ,mi ) (·|ω̄pub ) xi (ω̄pub , ωpub ),
as in Section 6.2.
Note that the map xiρ depends on si only through [si ]. Conversely, let xiρ ((ω̄pub , [si ]), mi )
be any such map. By deﬁnition of the equivalence classes [si ], and since all actions are
potentially played, there exists a map xi : Ωpub × Ωpub → R such that


xi ((ω̄pub , [si ]), mi ) ≤ E xi (ω̄pub , ωpub )
for all (ω̄pub , si ), mi , and with equality iﬀ [mi ] = [si ].51
50

We will assume that, up to a perturbation of ρ which is implemented by the p.r.d., each action proﬁle
a ∈ A is played with positive probability in each s ∈ S.
51
We refer to the literature on scoring rules for details.
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Under our irreducibility assumption, there is an equivalent LP formulation (see Puterman,
Ch. 8.8) of M, in which player i chooses the invariant joint distribution of states and actions.
Namely, agent i chooses π ∈ Π̂iρ to maximize


Eπ rρi + xiρ ,
(18)
where Π̂iρ ⊂ Δ(Ωpub × S i × M i ) is the set of joint distributions π such that

p(ω̄pub ,si ),mi (ωpub , ti )π(ω̄pub , si , mi ), for all (ωpub , ti ) ∈ Ωpub × S i ,
π(ωpub , ti , M i ) =
(ω̄pub ,si ),mi

(19)
that are induced by some stationary reporting strategy in M. (This is equation (3) from
Section 6.2.)
Thus, (ρ, x) is weakly truthful iﬀ truth-telling is an optimal strategy in M, that is, iﬀ
(18) is maximized by the (truth-telling) distribution π∗ ((ω̄pub , si ), mi ) := μρ (ω̄pub , si )1si =mi .
We use a duality-based approach. Consider the zero-sum game between player i (who
picks π ∈ Π̂iρ ) and the designer who picks52 xiρ : (Ωpub × [S i ]) × M i → [−M, M] to minimize
the reward


π(ω̄pub , si , mi )rρi (ω̄pub , si , mi )+
(π(ω̄pub , si , mi )−μ(ω̄pub , mi ))xiρ (ω̄pub , [si ], mi ).
(ω̄pub ,si ),mi

(ω̄pub ,si ),mi

This game has a value in pure strategies, and it is clear that any optimal strategy πρi for i is
such that

πρi (ω̄pub , si , mi ) = μ(ω̄pub , mi ) for all (ω̄pub , mi ).
si ∈[mi ]

That is, any optimal strategy of player i lies in Πiρ , as deﬁned in Section 6.2.
Note now that Eπ [xiρ ] is independent of π ∈ Πiρ . Thus, if π∗ does not maximize Eπ [rρi ]
over Πiρ , then it cannot possibly maximize Eπ [rρi + xiρ ] over Πiρ ⊆ Π̂iρ .
Conversely, assume that π∗ maximizes Eπ [rρi ] over Πiρ , and let xiρ be an optimal strategy


of the designer in the game. Thus, π∗ achieves maxΠiρ E rρi + xiρ which, by the optimality


of xiρ , is equal to maxΠ̂iρ E rρi + xiρ . This concludes the proof.
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Pick as M any common upper bound on the Lagrangian coeﬃcients in the optimization program:

max
πρi (ω̄pub , si , mi )rρi (ω̄pub , si , mi )
(ω̄pub ,si ,mi )

over πρi ∈ Π̂i (ρ) subject to for all (ω̄pub , mi ),

πρi (ω̄pub , si , mi ) = μ(ω̄pub , mi ).
si
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C

Proof of Theorem 3

C.1

A Quick Overview

We slightly rephrase Theorem 3 by writing V ∗∗ = H1 := {v ∈ RI : λ · v ≤ k1 (λ) for all λ},
where k1 (−ei ) = −v̄ i and k1 (λ) = k̄(λ) otherwise.
We will work under Assumption 1’ below, similar to Assumption 1, and will comment
on the adjustments to be made under the latter one.
Assumption 1’ There exists a policy ρ∗ : S → Δ(A), transfers x̃∗ : S → RI such that the
following holds with θ∗ := θρ∗ ,r+x̃∗ . For each player i ∈ I, any two s̄i = s̃i ∈ S i , and
any s−i ∈ S −i , one has
r i (s̄i , ρ∗ (s−i , s̄i )) + x̃∗ (s−i , s̄i ) + Eps−i,s̄i ,ρ∗ (s−i ,s̄i ) [θ∗ (t)]
≥ r i (s̄i , ρ∗ (s−i , s̃i )) + x̃∗ (s−i , s̃i ) + Eps−i,s̄i ,ρ∗ (s−i ,s̃i ) [θ∗ (t)],
with strict inequality for at least one s−i ∈ S −i .
The proof is a variant of the proof of Theorem 2, and we will skip many technical details.
We will construct a sequential equilibrium σ which implements a given payoﬀ. The play is
divided into an inﬁnite sequence of blocks of random length. Odd blocks serve as transition
blocks, and the even blocks are the main ones. The durations of the successive blocks are
independent random variables, which follow geometric distributions, with parameter (1−δ)β∗
and (1 − δ)β for odd and even blocks respectively. We will have β > β∗ , so that the expected
duration of the main blocks is much larger. As in the proof of Theorem 2, the end of a block
is “decided” by the p.r.d.; so this is revealed only after reports have been submitted in the
current round.
Under σ, players always report their true state, and they play a ﬁxed policy ρ[k] : M → A
while in block k.53 For k odd, ρ[k] is set to ρ∗ . For k even, the policy ρ[k] is computed in
the ﬁrst round, τk , of block k, based on the publicly available information.
The updating formulas at the end of block k rely on “transfers” x[k]. These transfers will
here be obtained as the sum of two components, xo : S × Y → RI and xt : S × S → RI ,
which only depend on the policy ρ[k] that is being implemented, and on a direction λ[k] ∈ Λ.
The transfers xo and xt provide respectively the incentives for playing obediently ρ[k] and
for reporting truthfully. For xo , we will rely on Assumption 2 and refer to Kandori and
Matsushima (1998). For xt , we will closely follow AS.
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Even following a lie.
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We ﬁrst explain how to choose together a policy ρ and transfers x, as a function of the
direction λ.

C.2

The Design of xt

The construction of xt is diﬀerent for odd and even blocks. For odd blocks, we simply set
xt := x̃∗ . For later use, we note that, thanks to Assumption 1’, truth-telling is strictly
optimal for player i in the decision problem with payoﬀ
r i (si , ρ∗ (mi , s−i )) + xit (mi , s−i ) + θ∗i (t),
as soon as the belief of player i over s−i has full support.
For even blocks, we rely on AS. Because a player may be indiﬀerent between diﬀerent
reports, transfers cannot be deﬁned independently of the discount factor unlike in the proof of
Theorem 2, and the design of xt takes into account the perturbations on reporting incentives
created by the transitions between blocks.
For given x : Ωpub ×S → RI , β < 1, γ ∈ RI and (ω̄pub , s) ∈ Ωpub ×S, Gβ ((ω̄pub , s), x, δ, γ)
is the δ-discounted version of the game in which in round n (i) the game stops with probability
ξ := (1 − δ)β with ﬁnal payoﬀ γ + (1 − δ)θ∗ (s), (ii) the stage payoﬀ in round n is otherwise
given by r(sn , a) + x(mn−1 , mn ), (iii) and the initial state in round 1 is s (with ω̄pub being a
“ﬁctitious” round 0 outcome).
Assume ﬁrst that λ ∈ Λ is a positive, non-coordinate direction and consider the MDP in
which players cooperate to maximize the λ-weighted sum of discounted payoﬀs in the game
Gβ ((ω̄pub , s), 0, δ, γ). The value Vδ,λ (ω̄pub , s) of this MDP does depend on γ and on (ω̄pub , s),
but there is a ﬁxed policy ρλ which
is optimal for all δ close to 1.54 For δ large, ρλ maximizes

δξ
˜
˜ ∗ (s) with ξ˜ =
λ · Eμρ (1 − ξ)r(s,
, over the set of all policies ρ, and therefore
a) + ξθ
1−δ(1−ξ)
also Eμρ [λ · r(s, a)] when taking the limit δ → 1, hence ρλ ∈ Ξ.
We now focus on the constrained version of the game Gβ ((ω̄pub , s), x, δ, γ) (still denoted
in the same way) in which players only choose which state to report, and actions following
the report proﬁle m are set to ρλ (m).
Claim 7 There exists xt : Ωpub × S → RI , with λ · xt (·) = 0, such that truth-telling is a
(sequential) equilibrium of Gβ ((ω̄pub , s), xt , δ, γ) (for every (ω̄pub , s).)
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The original proof of Blackwell (1962) does not directly apply (because transitions depend here on δ),
yet it adapts immediately.
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Proof. The result follows by specializing AS (as before, a key step in the proof of
Proposition 2) to our setup. Deﬁne ﬁrst VCG transfers x̄ : S → RI as

λi x̄i (s) :=
λj r j (sj , ρλ (s)).
j =i

Thus, truth-telling is an equilibrium of Gβ ((ω̄pub , s), x̄, δ, γ), but the “budget-balance” requirement is not met.

 τ −1

δ n−1 xi (sn ) denote the expected transfer to i until the
For s ∈ S, let T i (s) := Es,ρλ
n=1

round τ at which the game ends.
Next, for j ∈ I, s̃j ∈ S j and ω̄pub ∈ Ωpub , we deﬁne
ΔT j (ω̄pub , s̃j ) = Es−j ∼pρλ (·|ω̄pub ) T j (s̃j , s−j ) − Es∼pρλ (·|ω̄pub ) T j (s).
Thanks to the irreducibility assumption, ΔT j is bounded, uniformly over δ < 1.
We ﬁnally deﬁne the transfers xt : Ωpub × S → RI by the formula
λi xi (ω̄pub , s) = λi ΔT i (ω̄pub , si ) −

1  j
λ ΔT j (ω̄pub , sj ),
I − 1 j =i

so that λ · xt (·) = 0 holds by construction.
By the same argument as in AS, truth-telling is an equilibrium of Gβ ((ω̄pub , s), xt , δ, γ).
To be more speciﬁc, denote by γδ (ω̄pub , s) the payoﬀ induced by ρλ in Gβ ((ω̄pub , s), δ, xt , γ).
For each δ < 1, i ∈ I, ω̄pub ∈ Ωpub and si ∈ S i , the truthful report mi = si maximizes the
expectation of
(1 − δ) r i (si , ρλ (s−i , mi )) + xit (s̄, (s−i , mi )) + δγδi ((s−i , mi ), t .

At this point, we have thus assigned to each positive, non-coordinate direction λ a ﬁxed
policy ρλ ∈ Ξ which maximizes Eμρ [λ · r(s, ρ(s))], and δ-dependent transfers xt for which
the conclusion of Claim 7 holds. When λ ∈ Λ is a non-coordinate, but not necessarily
positive direction, this construction and the conclusions are still valid, provided one restricts
attention to the policies ρ : ×i∈I(λ) S i → A.
For λ = +ei , we let again ρ+ei : S i → A be a (ﬁxed) policy that maximizes the payoﬀ
of player i in Gβ ((ωpub , s), 0, δ, γ) (for all δ close to 1). Again, the policy ρ+ei maximizes
Eμρ [r i (s, ρ(s))], and the conclusions of Claim 7 trivially hold with xt (·) = 0.
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Finally, assume λ = −ei , and pick constant pure policies ρ−i = a−i ∈ A−i and a policy ρi : S i → Ai that minmaxes player i in G
 β ((ω̄pub , s), 0, δ, γ) that is, which achieves
˜
˜ ∗ (s) . Again, one can pick these policies indemina−i ∈A−i maxρi :S i →Ai E (1 − ξ)r(s,
a) + ξθ
pendently of δ, provided δ is close enough to 1, and Eμρ [r i (si , ρ(si ))] = v̄ i . The conclusions
of Claim 7 trivially hold with xt (·) = 0.
Transfers xt are independent of the ﬁnal payoﬀ γ, which we now set equal to

˜
˜ ∗ (s) .
γ := Eμρλ (1 − ξ)r(s,
ρλ (s)) + ξθ
Observe that limδ→1 λ·γ = k1 (λ),55 and γ satisﬁes the ﬁxed-point property γ = Eμρλ [γδ (ω̄pub , s)],
where γδ (ω̄pub , s) is the expected payoﬀ (under truth-telling and policy ρλ ) in the game
Gβ ((ω̄pub , s), x, δ, γ).
Finally, we deﬁne the δ-relative values θδ : Ωpub × S → RI by means of the equality
γδ (ω̄pub , s) = γδ + (1 − δ)θδ (ω̄pub , s).
By the irreducibility property, θδ is uniformly bounded for δ < 1.
We also deﬁne θ̃δ by the equality θδ (ω̄pub , s) = (1 − ξ)θ̃δ (ω̄pub , s) + ξθ∗ (s), with the
interpretation that θδ stands for the “ex ante” relative value, before the p.r.d. is observed,
and θ̃δ is the “ex post” relative value, once the p.r.d. has chosen not to stop the game Gβ in
the current round. Therefore, the continuation/ﬁnal payoﬀ is equal to γ + (1 − δ)θδ (ω̄pub , s)
prior to the p.r.d. and is next equal to γ + (1 − δ)θ̃δ (ω̄pub , s) or to γ + (1 − δ)θ∗ (s), depending
on the outcome of the p.r.d.

C.3

The Design of xo

The same construction of xo will apply to even and odd blocks.56 Let a policy ρ : S → A,
and a non-coordinate direction λ ∈ Λ be given.57
By Lemma 1 of Kandori and Matshushima (1998), Assumption 2 ensures that for any
pair {i, j} such that λi , λj = 0, and any d > 0, there exist x̂hi,j : S × Y → R, h = i, j, such
that
λi x̂ii,j (·) + λj x̂ji,j (·) = 0,
(20)
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Note that γ depends on δ through ξ̃.
Except that we do not have to require transfers to be balanced for the latter.
57
We will apply the following with ρ = ρ∗ or ρ = ρλ .
56
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and the following holds. For all s, a = ρ(s), and for all âh = ah , all ŝh ,
E[x̂hi,j (s, y) | s, a] − E[x̂hi,j (s, y) | a−h , âh , s−h , ŝh ] > d.
By subtracting the constant E[x̂ii,j (s, y) | s, a] from all values x̂ii,j (s, y) (which does not
aﬀect (20), since (20) must also hold in expectations), we may assume that, for our ﬁxed
choice of a, one has E[x̂hi,j (s, y) | s, a] = 0, for h = i, j and s ∈ S.

We then set x̂ = i=j x̂i,j . Given this normalization, we have that
E[x̂i (s, y) | a−i , âi , s−i , ŝi ] < −d,
for any choice (ŝi , âi ) such that ai = âi .
Intuitively, the transfer x̂i ensures that, when chosen for high enough d, it never pays
to deviate in action, even in combination with a lie, rather than reporting the true state
and playing the action proﬁle a that is agreed upon, holding the action proﬁle to be played
constant across reports ŝi , given s−i . Deviations in reports might also change the action
proﬁle played, but the diﬀerence in the payoﬀ from such a change is bounded, while d is
arbitrary.
Formally, consider the MDP in which player i faces truth-telling and ρ−i , chooses a
report mi ∈ M i = S i and an action ai ∈ Ai , and he gets the reward r i (s, ai , ρ−i (s−i , mi )) +
x̂i (s−i , mi , y). Then we may pick d > 0 such that every stationary optimal policy speciﬁes
i
ρ̂i (s−i , mi ) = ρi (s−i , mi ). Equivalently, it is uniquely optimal in the decision problems Dρ,x̂
to obey ρi at the action step (even after an incorrect report). Note that the incentives for
obedience are strict, so that they still hold when θρ,r+x̂ is slightly perturbed. Note also that
i
if
because of our normalization of x̂i , the private values in this MDP are still equal to θρ,r+x̂
i
i
player i sets m = s .
The argument is similar for the case of coordinate directions. For λ = +ei , we will use
a policy ρ : S i → A which maximizes Eμρ [r i (s, ρ(s))]. For λ = −ei , we will use a policy
ρ which achieves the min max in the deﬁnition of v̄ i . In both cases, we set xio = 0 and we
use Assumption 2 and follow Kandori and Matsushima (1998, Cases 1 and 2, Theorem 1) to
design xjo , j = i.
To summarize the previous and current sections, we have established, for ﬁxed λ ∈ Λ and
δ < 1, the existence of a policy ρλ ∈ Ξ, of transfers x(ω̄pub , m, y) = xt (ω̄pub , m) + xo (m, y),
and of θδ such that the properties below hold for all δ < 1 large enough:
E1 λ · x(·) = 0;
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˜
˜ ∗ (s)];
E2 limδ→1 λ · γ = k1 (λ), where γ := Eμρλ [(1 − ξ)r(s,
ρλ (s)) + ξθ
E3 For each ω̄pub ∈ Ωpub , i ∈ I and si ∈ S i , truth-telling and ρiλ (m) maximize the expectation of
(1 − ξ) r i (s, a) + xi (ω̄pub , ωpub ) + δθδi (ωpub , t) + ξθ∗i (s),
which is then equal (conditional on s−i ) to θδi (ω̄pub , s);58
E4 θδ and x are uniformly bounded, over δ < 1.
The conditions E1–E3 are somewhat similar to saying that (ρλ , x, γ) is feasible in a
discounted analogue of the program P(λ) which would be twisted to reﬂect the probability
ξ of switching. Note that truth-telling incentives are not strict.
We have also constructed x∗ : M → Y → RI such that (ρ∗ , x∗ ) is an admissible pair,
such that incentives to play ρ∗ (m) at the action step are strict, even following a lie.59

C.4
C.4.1

The Equilibrium Construction
The Parameters

The construction involves various parameters. Pick ﬁrst the exponents 0 < β∗ < β < 1.
Given Z, pick η > 0 such that Zη is contained in the interior of H1 , and ε0 > 0 such that
maxZη λ · z < k1 (λ) − 2ε0 for all directions λ ∈ Λ.
Next, we use a compactness argument similar to that of Lemma 7. Given λ ∈ Λ, subtract
ε0
λ from the map x that was associated to λ and ρλ in Sections C.2 and C.3, and rewrite
3
E1 and E2 as λ · x(·) < 0 and limδ→1 λ · γ > k1 (λ) − ε20 . This ensures that ρλ , the maps x
and θδ may be chosen to be locally independent of λ. Since Λ is compact, this ensures that
the transfers x may then be picked from a ﬁnite set of maps X as λ varies through Λ.θδ and
x ∈ X , valid for all δ < 1.
As in the proof of Theorem 2, we ﬁx κ1 large enough, let ε1 ∈ (0, ε0 ), set ε := ε1 /2κ1 ,
and then let ζ̄ be given by Lemma 8 applied with ε. Given these values, we ﬁnally let δ̄ be
close enough to one, so that a ﬁnite number of inequalities hold for all δ ≥ δ̄. Since most
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Here, the expectation is taken over s−i , a, y, t, under the assumption that (i) s−i is drawn according
to the belief held by player i (knowing that players −i used ρλ in the previous round) and (ii) players −i
report truthfully and play ρ−i .
59
In fact, it is even optimal to report truthfully ex post. This property is not used here, but will be used
in the proof of Theorem 4.
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computations will be omitted, we omit the exact conditions on κ1 and δ̄ under which the
computations below are valid.60
C.4.2

The Updating Process

The description accounts for the diﬀerence between odd and even blocks. Consider block
k + 1, starting in round n + 1 := τk+1 . If k + 1 is even, we deﬁne ﬁrst w[k + 1] through the
equality
w̃n+1 = ξ∗ w[k + 1] + (1 − ξ∗ )z[k],
(21)
where ξ∗ = (1 − δ)β∗ , and
1
1−δ
1−δ
w̃n+1 = z[k] −
v∗ +
x∗ (ωpub,n ).
δ
δ
δ

(22)

Given w[k + 1], pick λ[k + 1] ∈ Λ so that the conclusion of Lemma 8 holds. Set ρ[k + 1] = ρλ ,
x[k + 1] = x and θ[k + 1] = θδ . Next,


1−δ
θ∗ (mn+1 ) − (1 − δ)θ[k + 1](ω̄pub,n , mn+1 ). (23)
z[k + 1] := w[k + 1] + (1 − δ) 1 +
δξ∗
If k + 1 is odd, we deﬁne w[k + 1] by
w̃n+1 = ξw[k + 1] + (1 − ξ)z[k],

(24)

1
1−δ
1−δ
w̃n+1 = z[k] −
v[k] +
x[k](ωpub,n , mn+1 ).
δ
δ
δ

(25)

with ξ = (1 − δ)β and

Next, we set z[k + 1] := w[k + 1].
The process is initialized as follows. Given a target payoﬀ z̄ ∈ Z, we set z[1] := z̄ − (1 −
δ)Eπ [θ∗ (s)] and w[1] := z̄.
C.4.3

The Strategies

Under σ, players report truthfully their current state in every round, and play ρ(mn ) =
ρ∗ (mn ) or ρ(mn ) = ρ[k](mn ) if n belongs respectively to an odd or an even block.
The continuation payoﬀ of player i at the action step in round n, following a truthful report min = sin thus only depends on ωpub,n−1 , on sn and on the current value Tn
60

The computations are similar to those in Theorem 2, but not identical, hence the relevant conditions on
κ1 and δ̄ are not the same.
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of the auxiliary family (zn , wn , ρn , xn , vn ) (see the proof of Theorem 2), and will be denoted γ i (ωpub,n−1 , sn ; Tn ). Using (omitted) arguments similar to Lemmas 10 and 11, one has
γ(ωpub,n−1 , sn ; Tn ) = zn + (1 − δ)θ∗ (sn ) or γ(ωpub,n−1, sn ; Tn ) = zn + (1 − δ)θ̃δ (mn−1 , sn ), if
round n belongs to an odd or an even block respectively.
That σ is well-deﬁned follows from the next lemma.
Lemma 13 One has w[k] ∈ Zη for k even.
Proof. The proof goes by induction. Note ﬁrst that w[k] − z[k] ≤ (1 − δ)κ1 for all k,
and assume that w[k] ∈ Zη for some even k.61 With the obvious adjustments to the proof of
Lemma 9, one has
w[k + 2] − w[k] ≤ w[k + 2] − w[k + 1] + w[k + 1] − z[k] + z[k] − w[k]
1−δ
1−δ
1−δ
κ1 + (1 − δ)κ1 ≤ 3
κ1 .
≤
κ1 + 2
δξ∗
δξ
δξ
Set ζ = 3

1−δ
κ1 , and note that
δξ
1−δ
+ w[k + 2] − w[k + 1] + z[k] − w[k]
δξ
1−δ
1−δ
κ1 + (1 − δ)κ1 ≤ −εζ.
κ1 +
≤ −ε0 ×
δξ
δξ∗

λ[k] · (w[k + 2] − w[k]) ≤ −ε0 ×

The result follows as in Lemma 9.
C.4.4

Equilibrium Properties

We will argue brieﬂy that player i has no proﬁtable one-step deviation. We ﬁrst place
ourselves at the action step in round n, with τk ≤ n < τk+1 . At that step, his overall
continuation payoﬀ (assuming no deviation from round n + 1 on, and taking expectations at
round n + 1) is given by
i
i
+ (1 − δ)θn+1
(ωpub,n , sn+1 ) .
(1 − δ)rni + δ zn+1

Assume ﬁrst that k is odd. Algebraic manipulations (akin to Lemmas 10 and 11) show
that, for a ﬁxed action ain ∈ Ai , the expected continuation payoﬀ is (up to a term independent
of ain ) equal to


i
i
i
(1 − δ)E r i (sin , ρ−i
∗ (mn ), an ) + xo (mn , yn ) + θ∗ (sn+1 ) ,
61

One has w[2] ∈ Zη since w[1] ∈ Z and δ is close to one.
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where the expectation is taken over yn and sn+1 . Whether min = sin or not, the design of xo
ensures that the expectation is maximal for ρi (mn ).
Assume next that k is even. By similar manipulations, the expected continuation payoﬀ
62
is (again up to a term which does not depend on ain ) equal to


i
i
i
(1 − δ)E r i (sin , ρ−i
λn (mn ), an ) + xo (mn , yn ) + δθδ (ωpub,n , sn+1 ) .
Since δθδ is arbitrarily close to θρλn ,r+xt +x0 , the design of xo again ensures that the expectation
is uniquely maximized for ρiλn , provided δ is large enough.
We now place ourselves at the reporting step of round n, with τk < n ≤ τk+1 . If k is odd,
the truth-telling property follows using the same argument as in Theorem 2.63 Assume now
k even. The expected continuation payoﬀ is, up to a term which does not depend on min ,
(at most, with equality if min = sin ) equal64 to the expectation of
i
i
i
i
(1 − ξ) r i (sn , ρλn−1 (s−i
n , mn )) + x (ωpub,n−1 , ωpub,n ) + δθδ (ωpub,n , sn+1 + ξθ∗ (sn )

which, by E3, is maximized for min = sin . This implies the result.
We now comment on the diﬀerence between Assumption 1 and 1’. Instead of playing
a ﬁxed ρ∗ , which simpliﬁed the description, the play in odd blocks is now replaced by the
following. In the ﬁrst period of an odd block, a player is selected at random (using the p.r.d.);
if player i is selected and reported si ∈ S i , we use the p.r.d. to determine which one of the
sequences (akn ) ∈ Γi is played, according to the distribution that makes truthful reporting
strictly optimal. (This requires the discount factor to be above a certain threshold.) Yet
this sequence is only played for a random duration: a random time τ is determined using
the p.r.d., at which a new player is selected at random (this could be player i again); this
random time follows a geometric distribution with parameter (1−δ)β∗∗ with β∗∗ much smaller
than β∗ , the random duration of the odd block; β∗∗ and the minimum discount factor are
chosen so that strict incentives to report truthfully follow from Assumption 1. Note that,
given IPV, conditional on not being selected, the report of player i is irrelevant. On the
other hand, conditional on being selected, it is strictly optimal to report truthfully, given
Assumption 1. This (random) strategy proﬁle deﬁnes a relative value function θ∗ , to be used
in the deﬁnition of xt and xo in even blocks.
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We stress again that xo and θδ are the transfer and relative rent associated to ρλn in Sections C.2 and

C.3.
63

In fact, truth-telling is even ex post optimal in any such round.
Indeed, if the p.r.d. switches to a new block, the continuation “relative value” is at most θ∗ (sn ), with
equality if min = sin .
64
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D

Proof of Theorem 4

The proof of Theorem 4 consists in adding a layer of complexity to the proof of Theorem 3 to
deal with negative, unit directions. We will extensively refer to the latter to avoid duplications. We will work under the assumption that the distribution of signals is independent of
the current states. The proof for the general case is more cumbersome, but does not involve
additional insights.

D.1

Alternative Scores

We ﬁrst deﬁne modiﬁed scores k2 (λ) and the corresponding set H2 . We next observe that
the IPV assumption, together with Assumption 1’, ensures H2 = W .
Fix an arbitrary s∗ ∈ S. We deﬁne a class of ﬁnite-horizon games, parameterized by ﬁnal
payoﬀs. Given a horizon T ∈ N, ﬁnal transfers x : ΩTpub → RI , and θ : Ωpub × S → RI , we
deﬁne G(T, x, θ) as the T -round repetition of the underlying stage game with communication,
starting from the commonly known state proﬁle s∗ . The game G(T, x, θ) ends with the draw
of sT +1 in round T + 1.
Payoﬀs in G(T, x, θ) are given by

 T
1 
r(sn , an ) + x(hpub,T +1 ) + θ(ωpub,T , sT +1 ) ,
T n=1
where hpub,T +1 is the public history in the T rounds. Information and play is as in the inﬁnite
horizon game.
Denote by C a uniform bound on θρ,r , when ρ ranges through the set of all policies. For
λ ∈ Λ and T ∈ N, we deﬁne the maximization problem P̃T (λ) : k̃T (λ) := sup λ · v, where the
supremum is taken over all (σ, x, θ), such that
- σ is a sequential equilibrium of G(T, x, θ) with payoﬀ v.
- λ · x(·) ≤ 0 and λ · θ(·) ≤ C.
Set k2 (λ) = lim supT k̃T (λ), and H2 := {v ∈ RI : λ · v ≤ k2 (λ) for all λ ∈ Λ}.
Proposition 2 One has H2 = W .
Proposition 2 follows from Lemmas 14 and 15 below.65
65

Only the inclusion H2 ⊇ W is relevant for the proof.
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Lemma 14 For λ = −ei , one has k2 (λ) = k̄(λ).
Proof. Fix λ ∈ Λ with λ = −ei for all i ∈ I. Let a weakly truthful pair (ρ, x) be given
with λ · x(·) = 0, set v := Eμρ [r(s, a) + x(ω̄pub , ωpub )], and θ := θρ,r+x . Given an integer
T ∈ N, deﬁne xT : ΩTpub → RI as
xT (hpub,T ) =

T


x(ωpub,n−1 , ωpub,n ),

n=1

where ωpub,0 ∈ Ωpub is arbitrary and ωpub,1 = (s∗ , y1 ). Let σT be the strategy proﬁle in
G(T, xT , θ) deﬁned as : (i) each player i reports truthfully min = sin in all rounds, irrespective
of past play, (ii) in each round n, player i plays ρi (mn ) if min = sin , and any action ai which
maximizes the expectation of
r i (sin , ρ−i (mn ), ai ) + xi (ωpub,n−1 , ωpub,n ) + θi (ωpub,n , sn+1 )
otherwise. Denote by γ̃T (σT ) the expected payoﬀ of σT in G(T, x, θ).
Since (ρ, x) is weakly truthful, it is easily checked that σT 66 is a sequential equilibrium in
G(T, x, θ), hence λ · γ̃T (σT ) ≤ k̃T (λ). On the other hand, by the irreducibility assumption,
one has limT →+∞ γ̃T (σT ) = Eμρ [r(s, a) + x(ω̄pub , ωpub )] = v, so that λ · v ≤ k2 (λ). Using
Lemma 5, this shows that k̄(λ) ≤ k2 (λ), as desired.
We next prove that k2 (λ) ≤ k̄(λ). Fix ε > 0. Given T ∈ N, pick a feasible triple (σ, x, θ)
in P̃T (λ) which achieves k2 (λ) up to ε. Mimicking the argument in Lemma 2, there is a proﬁle
σ̃T which only depends on the states of players in I(λ) and such that λ · γ̃T (σT ) ≤ λ · γ̃T (σ̃T ).
Since λ ∈ Λ, λ · θ(·) ≤ C and λ · x(·) ≤ 0, one has
λ · γ̃T (σ̃T ) ≤ λ · γT (σT ) +

C
,
T

(26)

where γT (σT ) is the payoﬀ induced in the T -round game G(T, 0, 0) with no ﬁnal payoﬀs. Denote by vT (λ) := supσ λ · γT (σ) the value of the λ-weighted T -round game, where the supremum is taken over σ : ×i∈I(λ) S i → A. By the irreducibility assumption, limT →+∞ vT (λ) =
k̄(λ). Let now T → +∞ in (26) to get k2 (λ) − ε ≤ k̄(λ). The result follows.
Lemma 15 For λ = −ei , k2 (λ) = −wii .
66

When supplemented with appropriate beliefs.
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Proof. In all games G(T, x, θ) considered for this lemma, the reports will be “babbling,”
that is, a player sends the same report independently of his type in any given period. We
set θ = 0. Given k ∈ N, let Ajk := {αj ∈ Δ(Aj ) : kαj (ajl ) ∈ N for all ajl ∈ Aj }. The set Ajk
consists of those mixed action proﬁles that assign rational probabilities with denominator
k. For any αj ∈ Δ(Aj ), there exists αkj ∈ Ajk such that d(αkj , αj ) ≤ |Aj |/k; similarly, for all
j 67
We write Σjk for
α−i ∈ ×j =i Δ(Aj ), d(αk−i , α−i ) ≤ |A−i |/k, for some αk−i ∈ A−i
k := ×j =i Ak .
the strategies of j with values in Ajk , and we let

 T

1
σ k = arg min max lim sup Eσ
g i (sin , ain , yn )
−i
i
−i
T
σ
σ ∈Σk
T
n=1
be minmax strategies when players −i are constrained to strategies in Σ−i
k . Given the product
structure, these strategies may be taken measurable with respect to the history of signals of
i
player i, and we write hipub,n ∈ Hpub,n
= (Y i )n−1 for such public histories. We write w i (k)
for the limiting expected payoﬀ of player i under σ k . Using the irreducibility assumption, it
follows from standard arguments that limk→+∞ w i (k) = wii .68
Given T ∈ N, we also write w i (k, T ) for the highest expected payoﬀ of player i over the
i
i
ﬁrst T rounds, when facing σ −i
k . Given a realized public history hpub,T +1 ∈ Hpub,T +1 and
αk−i ∈ A−i
k , we let
i
−i
T (αk−i ) = {n = 1, . . . , T : σ −i
k (hpub,n ) = αk }
−i 69
and f [αk−i ] ∈ Δ(Y ) be the empirical disdenote the rounds at which σ −i
k prescribes αk ,
tribution of signals observed in those stages. For j = i and y j ∈ Y j , we also denote by
f [αk−i ](y j ) the empirical frequency of y j over the stages in T (αk−i ). We now let

D j (hpub,T +1 ) =




|T (αk−i )|   −i
f [αk ](y) − f [αk−i ](y −j )P[y j | αkj ] ,
T
−i
y

α−i
k ∈Ak

and, given φ > 0, we deﬁne the test:
⎧
⎨1 if D j (h
pub,T +1 ) < φ,
τφj (hpub,T +1 ) =
⎩0 otherwise.
We can ﬁnally state one claim that directly parallels one of Gossner (1995).
67

Throughout the lemma, we use the Euclidean distance.
And that min and max are indeed achieved, so that σ k is well-deﬁned.
69
Here, hipub,n refers to an initial segment of hipub,T +1 .
68
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Claim 8 Given ε > 0 and φ > 0, there exists T0 such that, if T ≥ T0 ,


Pσj ,σ−j τφj (hT ) = 0 < ε.
k

for all j = i and all strategy proﬁles σ −j .
In words, if player j uses σ jk , he is very likely to pass the test τφj no matter players −j’s
strategy proﬁle. The proof of Claim 8 relies on approachability theory, see Gossner (1995)
for details.
2ε
, and let T0 be given by Claim 8 applied with ε/2r̄ and
r̄(I − 1)
Given T ≥ T0 , we pick M > 0 such that

Given ε > 0, we let φ <
φ.70

−T r̄ − εM > T r̄ − 2εM,
r̄
or equivalently, M > T . That is, M is a punishment suﬃciently large (for failing the test)
ε
that getting the worst reward for T rounds followed by a probability of failing the test of up
to ε exceeds the payoﬀ from the highest reward for T rounds followed by a probability of
failing the test of at least 2ε.
We next set xi (·) = 0 and, for j = i,
⎧
⎨−M if τ j (h
pub,T +1 ) = 0,
φ
(27)
xj (hpub,T +1 ) =
⎩0
otherwise.
The second claim states that, if all players j = i pass the test with high probability,
player i is eﬀectively punished.
Claim 9 For every sequential equilibrium σ of G(T, x, θ), one has

 T

1
Es ,σ
g i (sin , ain , yn ) ≤ w i (k, T ) + 2ε.
T ∗
n=1



Proof. By the condition on M, one has Pσ τφj (hT ) = 0 < 2ε1 in all equilibria of G(T, x, θ).


ε
for all j = i. On the
Take any strategy proﬁle in G(T, x, θ) such that Pσ τφj (hT ) = 0 <
2r̄
event ∩j =i {τφj (hT ) = 1}, one has for all j = i,
  |T (α−i )| 

k
f [α−i ](y) − f [α−i ](y −j )P[y j | αj ] < φ,
k
k
k
T
−i
y
αk

70

Here, r̄ is a uniform bound on all payoﬀs in the game.
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which implies, by repeated substitution,
  |T (α−i )| 

k
f [α−i ](y) − f [α−i ](y i ) ×j =i P[y j | αj ] < (I − 1)φ.
k
k
k
T
−i
y

(28)

αk

We have that


⎛
⎞




1    ⎝ i i i
1
i i
i
i i
i
−i i
−i
−i ⎠
g
g (sn , an , yn ) ≤
(s
,
a
,
y
)
−
g
(s
,
a
,
(ỹ
,
y
))P[ỹ
|
α
]
n
n
n
n
n
n
k

T n=1
T −i 

ỹ −i
αk
n∈T (α−i
k )
1   i i i
g (sn , an , (ỹ −i , yni ))P[ỹ −i | αk−i ].
+
T −i
−i
−i
T


αk

n∈T (αk ) ỹ

By (28), the ﬁrst sum is bounded by ε/2 on the event ∩j =i {τφj (hT ) = 1}, and by r̄ on its
ε
. The expectation of the second sum under
complement, which is of probability at most
2r̄
an arbitrary proﬁle σ does not depend on σ −i and is equal to the payoﬀ induced by (σ i , σ −i
k ).
This implies the result.
Claim 9 implies k̃T (−ei ) ≥ −w i (k, T ) − ε for all large T . Letting ﬁrst T → +∞, then
k → +∞, we get k2 (−ei ) ≥ −wii − ε, hence k2 (λ) ≥ −wii since ε is arbitrary. The reverse
inequality is obvious.

D.2

The Strategies

Given z ∈ Z, and an initial distribution of states p ∈ Δ(S), we will construct a sequential
equilibrium σ with payoﬀ z for δ close enough to one.
As in Theorem 3, the play is divided into an inﬁnite sequence of blocks, with odd blocks
serving as transition blocks. Even blocks are now either “regular,” or devoted to the punishment of a single player. The behavior in odd and in regular even blocks is identical to that
in Theorem 3. In contrast, the duration of an punishment even block is ﬁxed and set equal
to (1 − δ)−β rounds.
The nature of an even block k is dictated by the direction λ[k] ∈ Λ. If λ[k] is close to
i
−e for some i, block k is devoted to the punishment of player i. It is otherwise regular.
D.2.1

Punishment Blocks

The equilibrium behavior in punishment blocks relies on an elaborate version of Lemma 15,
which we now introduce. Given T ∈ N, x : M × Y T → RI , δ < 1 and m ∈ M, we denote by
68

G(m, δ, x, T ) a discounted T -round version of G(T, x, θ∗ ) without communication and initial
state m ∈ M. That is, in each round n = 1, . . . , T , players observe their private states (sin )
choose actions (ain ), and (yn , sn+1 ) ∈ Y × S is drawn according to psn ,an .
The payoﬀ vector is
 T

1−δ
δ n−1 r(sn , an ) + δ T x(m, y ) + δ T θ∗ (sT +1 ) ,
(29)
1 − δ T +1 n=1
where y = (y1 , . . . , yT ) is the sequence of public signals received along the play.
Lemma 16 For every ε2 > 0, there is a constant κ ∈ R and δ̄ < 1 such that, for every
player i ∈ I and every discount factor δ ≥ δ̄, the following holds.
With T = (1 − δ)−1/2 , there exists x[i] : M × ΩTpub → RI and γ[i] ∈ RI such that:
(a) x[i] ≤ κT and xi [i](·) ≥ 0.
(b) |γ i [i] − wii | <

ε2
.
2

(c) γ[i] is a sequential equilibrium payoﬀ of G(m, δ, x[i], T ) for every m ∈ S.
Plainly, x and γ can then be chosen such that |γ i [i] − wii | < ε2 and xi [i](·) >

ε2
.
2

Proof. Fix ε2 > 0, i ∈ I and m ∈ M. We set ε := ε2 /18, κ = r̄/ε and prove that the
conclusion holds for 2κ.
The choice of κ guarantees that, for each T , −T r̄ + κT (1 − ε̃) > T r̄ + κT (1 − 2ε̃).
Pick δ1 < 1 such that the same holds for each δ ∈ (δ1 , 1), when payoﬀs are discounted
with δ and T = (1 − δ)−1/2 :
−

T


δ

n−1

T

r̄ + δ κT (1 − ε̃) >

n=1

T


δ n−1 r̄ + δ T κT (1 − 2ε̃).

n=1

Pick now k ∈ N such that |wii − w i (k)| < ε, then T̄ such that |w i (k) − w i (k, T )| < ε for
all T ≥ T̄ .71
We follow closely Lemma 15. We take φ and T0 as speciﬁed after Claim 8. We let δ2 < 1
be such that T = (1 − δ)−1/2 max(T̄ , T0 ) for all δ ≥ δ2 and δ3 < 1 such that the normalized
δ-discounted sum of payoﬀs in the ﬁrst T = (1 − δ)−1/2 stages diﬀers from the arithmetic
mean by at most ε, for all δ ≥ δ3 .
71

Recall the deﬁnition of wi (k, T ) from Lemma 15. Note however that the deﬁnition has to be amended,
to reﬂect the fact that the initial state proﬁle is m and no longer s∗ . We still use the same notation.
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Let δ ≥ max(δ1 , δ2 , δ3 ) be arbitrary. Deﬁne as before xi [i](·) = 0, and, for j = i, xj [i] as
in (27) with M = κT . Pick an arbitrary equilibrium σ[i, m] of G(m, δ, x[i], T ). It follows,
i
as in Claim 9, that the (discounted) payoﬀ w̃m
of player i under σ[i, m] does not exceed
i
i
w (k, T ) + 2ε ≤ wi + 4ε.
i
i
i
Observe also that w̃m
≥ wii −ε provided δ is close enough to one. Hence w̃m
− w̃m
  < 5ε.
j
j
[i] properly
For all j ∈ I, deﬁne xjm [i] by adding to xj [i] the quantity maxm w̃m [i] − w̃m
normalized. The added constant does not aﬀect incentives, but ensures that the new equilibrium payoﬀ vector, γ[i], is independent of m ∈ S.
Given this redeﬁnition of x, we have that |γ i [i] − w i | < 9ε = ε2 /2 and xi [i] ≥ 0 as desired.

D.2.2

The Parameters

As in Theorem 4, given Z, pick ﬁrst η > 0 such that Zη is contained in the interior of H2 ,
and ε0 > 0 such that maxZη λ · z < k2 (λ) − 2ε0 for all directions λ ∈ Λ. Let κR be obtained
when applying Lemma 16 with ε := ε0 .
Pick εR < ε0 /κR , and set Λ̃ := Λ \ ∪i B(−ei , εR ). Replicating with the compact set Λ̃
the same compactness argument as in Section C.4.1, we may assume wlog that the transfers
x are picked from a ﬁnite set of maps X as λ varies through Λ̃.θδ and x ∈ X , valid for all
δ < 1. Pick next β∗ ∈ (0, 1/2).
As in the proof of Theorems 2 and 3, we ﬁx κ2 large enough, let ε1 ∈ (0, ε0), set ε :=
ε1 /2κ1 , and then let ζ̄ be given by Lemma 8 applied with ε. Given these values, we ﬁnally
let δ̄ be close enough to one, so that a ﬁnite number of inequalities hold for all δ ≥ δ̄. Again,
we omit the exact conditions on κ2 and δ̄ under which the computations below are valid.
D.2.3

The Updating Process

We follow Section C.4.2. Consider a block k + 1, starting in round n + 1 := τk+1 . If k + 1 is
even, we deﬁne ﬁrst w[k + 1] and w̃n+1 by (21) and (22), and we pick λ[k + 1] ∈ Λ so that
the conclusion of Lemma 8 holds.
If λ[k + 1] ∈ Λ̃, so that block k + 1 is regular, we deﬁne (ρ[k + 1], x[k + 1], v[k + 1], θ[k + 1])
as in Section C.2, and let z[k + 1] be deﬁned by (23).
If instead λ[k + 1] ∈ B(−ei , ε3 ) for some i ∈ I, we set


1−δ
z[k + 1] := w[k + 1] + (1 − δ) 1 +
θ∗ (mn ).
δξ∗
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Assume now that k + 1 is odd. If block k was regular, we deﬁne w[k + 1] and w̃n+1 by means
of (24) and (25), and set z[k + 1] := w[k + 1].
If instead λ[k] ∈ B(−ei , ε3 ) for some i ∈ I, we set
1
1 − δT
z[k]
−
γ[i] + (1 − δ)x[i](mτk , yτk , . . . , yτk+1−1 ).
δT
δT
The process is initialized as in Theorem 4.
w[k + 1] = z[k + 1] :=

D.2.4

The Strategies

Fix a player i. Let block k be an i∗ -punishment block. If the report of i in round τk was
truthful (miτk = siτk ) player i plays σ i [mτk , i∗ ] up to round τk+1 = τk + T . If instead player
i lied about his state in the initial round, τk , of the punishment phase, player i plays a
sequential rational strategy against σ −i [mτk , i∗ ] in the game G(siτk , m−i
τk , δ, x[i∗ ], T ).
In any block which is not a punishment block, the strategy of player i is deﬁned as in
the proof of Theorem 4.
That σ is well-deﬁned follows from the next lemma.
Lemma 17 One has w[k] ∈ Zη for k even.
Proof. We proceed as in Lemma 13. Assume that w[k] ∈ Zη for some even k. It suﬃces
to deal with the case where block k is a i∗ -punishment block, for some i∗ ∈ I. From the
updating formula, it follows that
1 − δT
w[k + 1] − z[k] ≤
κ2 + (1 − δ)κ2 T,
δT
so that
w[k + 2] − w[k] ≤ w[k + 2] − w[k + 1] + z[k] − w[k] + w[k + 1] − z[k]
1−δ
1 − δT
≤
κ2 +
κ2 + (1 − δ)κ2 T + (1 − δ)κ2 .
δξ∗
δT
Denote by ζ the right-hand side.
On the other hand,
1−δ
λ[k] · (w[k + 2] − w[k]) ≤
κ2 + (1 − δ)κ2 + λ[k] · (w[k + 1] − z[k]).
δξ∗
Since λ[k] · (z[k] − γ[i]) ≤ −2ε0 × 1−δ
δT
computations and the choice of δ̄ that

T

and λ[k] · x[i] ≤ 0, it follows from elementary

λ[k] · (w[k + 2] − w[k]) ≤ −ε1 ξ,
hence w[k + 2] ∈ Zη .
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D.2.5

The Equilibrium Property

Fix a player i ∈ I. As in Theorem 3, the construction of the strategy proﬁle σ ensures
that the continuation payoﬀ of player i at the action step of a given round n is given by
γ i (ωpub,n−1 , sn ; Tn ) = zn + (1 − δ)θ∗ (sn ) or zn + (1 − δ)θ̃δ (ωpub,n−1 , sn ) whenever min = sin and
round n is not part of a punishment block. In addition, the continuation payoﬀ in the ﬁrst
stage of a i∗ -punishment block is γ i [i∗ ], again if min = sin .
For use below, we make the following observation. Fix m ∈ M, i ∈ I, si ∈ S i , and consider
the variant G̃i (m, δ, x[i∗ ], T ) of G(m, δ, x[i∗ ], T ) in which the initial state of i is si instead of
mi .72 Thanks to the irreducibility property, the highest payoﬀ of i in G̃i (m, δ, x[i∗ ], T ) when
facing σ −i [i∗ , m] diﬀers from the payoﬀ γ i [i∗ ] induced by σ[i∗ , m] in G(m, δ, x[i∗ ], T ) (and
therefore from the payoﬀ induced by σ[i∗ , (m−i , si )] in G((m−i , si ), δ, x[i∗ ], T )) by at most
(1 − δ)κ̄, where κ̄ is a constant that only depends on κ2 and on the primitives of the game.
Thus, misreporting at the beginning of a punishment block does not beneﬁt much.
That player i cannot proﬁtably deviate at the action step of a given round n follows
as in Theorem 3, unless n is part of a punishment block, in which case it follows from the
sequential rationality of σ in that block.
That player i cannot proﬁtably deviate by lying in a regular block also follows as in
Theorem 3. On the other hand, players babble in punishment blocks.
We now place ourselves at the reporting step of a round n in a transition block. There
are two cases: either n is the ﬁrst stage of the transition block, following a i∗ -punishment
block; or it is not. In the former case, the belief of i is derived from the public history and
the strategies σ[i∗ ]; in the latter, it is derived using ρ∗ . In both cases, the belief of i over
s−i
n has full support, and the optimality of truth-telling follows along the lines of Theorem 3,
using (i) the ex post optimality of truth-telling under ρ∗ and (ii) the fact that misreporting
in the ﬁrst round of a punishment block has only a minor impact (of the order of (1 − δ),
see above) on the continuation payoﬀ of player i.

E

Proofs for the Correlated Case

Proof of Lemma 6. Assumptions 2’(a)–2’(b) are the counterparts of Assumption 2
(specialized to the action proﬁles that are played), so that the result follows exactly as in
the proof of Theorem 3.
72

But ﬁnal transfers are still given by x[i∗ ](m, y).

72

Proof of Theorem 5. Given Lemma 6, we may focus on the reporting step, and then
augment the resulting transfers with those ensuring that players do not want to deviate at
the action step (on and oﬀ-path for all λ = ±ei , and for j = i in case λ = ±ei ; on path only
if λ = ±ei and j = i).
At the reporting step, we must distinguish as usual between coordinate and non-coordinate
directions. It suﬃces to consider non-coordinate directions with only two non-zero coordinates λi , λj . Fix ρ ∈ Ξ throughout. Because of detectability (π m̄,ā,ȳ (· | ĉ) ∈
/ co Ri (m̄, ā, ȳ),
implied by Assumption 5.1), there exists transfers xi that ensure that truthful reporting by
player i is strictly optimal. Because of weak identiﬁability (invoking 5.2 if sgn(λi ) = sgn(λj )
and 5.1 otherwise), we can apply Lemma 2 of Kosenok and Severinov (2008) –which relies
on the results of d’Aspremont, Crémer and Gérard-Varet– and conclude that these transfers
can be chosen so that λ · x(·) = 0.
For direction λ = ±ei (considering an arbitrary ρ ∈ Ξ if λ = ei , and ρ = ρi if λ = −ei ),
we set xi = 0 and use Assumption 4 to conclude that there exists transfers xj , j = i, so that
player j has incentives to tell the truth. Given that λj = 0 for all j = i, we have λ · x(·) = 0.
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